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I. INTRODUCTION
To prevent the unreasonable burdening of interstate commerce that results from discriminatory state and local taxation of
rail, motor, and air carrier property, Congress enacted section 306
of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
(4R Act),1 section 31 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,2 and section
532(b) of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982.' These
statutes represent the result of two decades of congressional deliberation over property tax discrimination against interstate carriers.4 Because Congress enacted the 4R Act first and because tax
discrimination against rail carriers has been the most egregious,
the overwhelming majority of litigation in this area has involved
challenges to state and local tax schemes by rail carriers. As a result, this Note concentrates on section 11503. When necessary,
analogies are drawn between court decisions interpreting section
11503 and probable interpretations of similar provisions in the motor and air carrier statutes. The fact that the three statutes are
identical or nearly identical in many of their significant provisions
justifies this approach.
A lack of uniformity has characterized judicial construction of
these statutes. Ambiguities within the statutes are responsible for
much of the confusion. Courts have differed in their interpretations of terms that are fundamental to the statutes' application.
Similarly, courts have differed in their approaches to determining
whether an interstate carrier is suffering discrimination. 5 As a consequence of this judicial divergence, carriers in some jurisdictions
receive more favorable treatment than those in other jurisdictions.
This Note analyzes the current state of the law concerning
property tax discrimination against rail, motor, and air carriers
since the passage of sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d). Part II
discusses the legislative history of the federal statutes, which appears mostly in reports of the congressional committees that considered, but failed to enact, earlier versions of the legislation. Part
1. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54-55 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26c, recodified
at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 in accordance with the Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-473, § 11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445-46) [hereinafter § 11503 or the 4R Act].
2. Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 31, 94 Stat. 793, 823-24 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503a) [hereinafter § 11503a].
3. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 532(b), 96 Stat. 671, 701-02 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d))
[hereinafter § 1513(d)].
4. See infra notes 6-33 and accompanying text.
5. For the statutory definition of discrimination, see infra text accompanying note 64.
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III addresses the constitutionality of the federal statutes. Part IV
provides an overview of the statutes' provisions and identifies the
ambiguities that have led courts to interpret and apply them differently. Part V considers in detail the judicial construction of the
statutes and examines the varying approaches taken in different
jurisdictions. Part VI briefly introduces the problems existing in
the interstate oil pipeline industry, an industry that has yet to receive federal statutory protection despite congressional recognition
more than twenty years ago that pipeline companies were being
discriminated against by state and local taxing authorities. Part
VII of this Note concludes by outlining several proposals for
greater uniformity among courts in the interpretation of these
statutes and recommending congressional action promoting
uniformity.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Pursuant to its plenary commerce clause powers, Congress established statutory protection against discriminatory state and local property taxation 6 for rail, motor, and air carriers in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, and the Airport and Airway Improvement Act
of 1982. Congress developed most of the legislative history of these
statutes during the fifteen years prior to the statutes' enactment.
The bulk of the legislative history relates to tax discrimination
against the railroad industry;" legislative history concerning the
motor and air carrier statutes is minimal." The purpose for enact6. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Congress held many hearings and considered
various reports pertaining to tax discrimination against interstate transportation carriers,
See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 128 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 207 nn.4-6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 & n.8 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
During the legislative process, Professors Paul H. Sanders and Paul J. Hartman of Vanderbilt University played a significant role in convincing Congress that it had the constitutional power to prohibit this type of tax discrimination. See S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d
Seass. 11-12 (1968). Both professors pointed out that this type of legislation was not unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's ruling in Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County,
365 U.S. 744 (1961), discussed infra at notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., H.R REP. No. 1395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3009, 3013-18; S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Seass. 14, 65-66, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 14, 79-80; S. REP. No. 585, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. (1975);
H.R. REP. No. 768, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. (1975); H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Seass.
(1975); S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Seass. (1972); S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Seass. (1968).
8. The legislative history of the motor carrier statute's taxation provisions lists only
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ing these statutes, nevertheless, was the same. Congress intended
to revitalize the rail, motor, and air carrier industries by prohibiting discriminatory state and local property taxes. Congress anticipated that interstate commerce would benefit once consumers took
advantage of the lower cost of using these carriers resulting from
the carriers' protection from discriminatory taxes under this
legislation."
Congress long had recognized that state and local governments
discriminated in their taxation of interstate transportation carriers, 10 noting that interstate carriers are "targets" for discriminatory state and local taxation because they are nonvoting, often
nonresident entities and because they cannot easily remove their
rights-of-way and terminals from the state." States frequently
practiced this discrimination against interstate carriers by classifying their property at tax rates higher than property owned by
other commercial and industrial concerns.' Although classification
schemes are not in themselves unconstitutional, 8 Congress was
particularly suspicious of this practice because reclassification
often occurred after a successful challenge of the state's tax system.1 4 The legislative history indicates that states discriminated
the types of taxation that the statute does and does not prohibit. See H.R. REP. No. 1069,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2283, 2327. The
legislative history of the air carrier statute's taxation provisions is even more limited, stating
merely, in effect, that the air carrier statute has the same purpose and scope as the motor
carrier statute. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1188.
9. Congress was aware that consumers paid higher prices for transportation because
interstate carriers passed the cost of the discriminatory taxes on to the consumer. See S.
REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972) (quoting S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1969)). See generally Statutory Comment, The RailroadRevitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976: Improving the Railroads' Competitive Position, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
575 (1977) (arguing that, in general, the 4R Act restores competition in the transportation
industry).
10. Congress' first major statement on the issue of state and local tax discrimination
against interstate transportation carriers appeared in a report entitled "National Transportation Policy" prepared by the Senate Committee on Commerce. See S. REP. No. 445, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1961). After the report, several unsuccessful bills were proposed to end
the discrimination. Finally, Congress passed the 4R Act in 1976. For a list of these bills, see
cases cited supra note 6.
11. S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).
12. See id. at 5.
13. See Nashville, Chatt. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
14. See S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1968) (pointing out that Kentucky
took this action in 1965).
By 1969, Congress recognized a clear trend among states to classify the property of
interstate carriers at higher tax rates than other commercial or industrial property owners.
See S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1969). Nevertheless, state courts continued to
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through variations in assessment or tax rates, 15 and that state and
local governments took advantage of interstate carriers by capitalizing on certain economic changes occurring after World War II.
Although the market values of residential and commercial properties increased substantially, assessed values remained constant. By
contrast, the market value of property owned by interstate carriers
did not increase similarly. Interstate carriers, therefore, experienced unfavorable state and local tax consequences.' 6
Congress considered railroads to be the interstate carriers
most burdened by discriminatory state and local taxation.17 As
early as 1944, approximately half the states admitted to Congress
that they were taxing railroads excessively.' 8 In an examination of
the railroad industry presented to Congress, the Association of
American Railroads 9 concluded that there was "a studied and deliberate practice of assessing railroadproperty at a proportion of
full value substantially higher than other property subject to the
same tax rates."2 0 As a result, railroads accounted for ninety percent of the approximately one billion dollars that interstate carriers paid in discriminatory state and local taxes from 1960 to
1969.21 By 1970, at least twenty-one states discriminatied significantly against railroads.2 2 Four states taxed railroad property by
an excess of more than fifty percent over other commercial and
industrial property in their ratio of assessed value to true market
value.2 3 In response to the degree of existing tax discrimination,
uphold discriminatory tax classification systems. See, e.g., Apache County v. Atchison, T.

and S. F. Ry., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970) (upholding Arizona's tax classification
scheme that assessed railroad property at a higher rate than other business property).
15. S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).

16. S.REP. No. 445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1961).
17.
18.
19.
has 240

S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969).
Id. at 4 (quoting H.R. Doc, No. 160, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1944)).
The Association of American Railroads (AAR) was founded in 1934 and currently
members. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE U.S. §

3107 (20th ed. 1986). The AAR serves as the "[c]oordinating and research agency of the
American railway industry." Id.
20. S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) (emphasis in original); S. REP. No.
1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) (emphasis in original).
21. S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1969).
22. The total percentage of excessive taxation in the twenty-one most discriminatory
states increased from 37.87% in 1968 to 38.31% in 1970. Compare S. REP. No. 630, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) with S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972). These statistics

were provided to Congress by the Association of American Railroads.
23. S.REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972). The four most discriminatory states
were Arizona, Idaho, Mississippi, and South Carolina. See id. Although this was an improvement over five years earlier when eight states were taxing railroad property excessively by
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Congress passed the 4R Act in 1976, making rail carriers the first
interstate carriers protected from discriminatory property
taxation.
Congress also was concerned with the judicial process, which
failed to arrest the discriminatory state and local tax schemes
aimed at interstate carriers. Congress observed that "[s]tate equalization agencies generally ha[d] been given power to equalize assessment ratios between assessment jurisdictions but [were] prohibited from altering the individual assessments made by any one
assessor." 24 As a result, the taxpayer had the extremely difficult
burden of proving an improper assessment. 25 Additionally, courts
exercised limited review in tax assessment cases, reasoning that
they should not readily overturn the judgment of local assessors
because state legislatures typically did not provide the assessors
with standards by which to determine property values. 26 Because
courts gave such great deference to state and local taxing authorities, interstate carriers that challenged inequitable assessments
were at an almost insurmountable disadvantage when attempting
to obtain relief.
Congress recognized the need for a federal forum in which interstate carriers could challenge the allegedly discriminatory taxing
policies of state and local governments.27 Congress, therefore, decided to create an express exception to the Tax Injunction Act. 8
That Act prohibits federal district courts from granting relief
against the assessment, levy, or collection of a tax established
under state law unless the state courts could not provide a "plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy. '29 Congress concluded that the Tax
Injunction Act prevented interstate carrier plaintiffs from having
access to the federal judicial system, yet the states did not provide
an adequate state court remedy.3 0 In many states, for example,
state law forced plaintiffs to bring suit against the tax collectors
rather than the tax assessors. Therefore, because counties generally
50% or more, Congress wanted to eliminated all discrimination. See id.; S. REP. No. 1483,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
24. S. REP. No. 445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1961).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1975); S. REP. No. 630,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1969).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
29. H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1975); S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-7 (1969).
30. S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1969).
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are the tax collecting bodies, an interstate carrier had to bring suit
against1 every county in which the carrier operated to get complete
3
relief
Although this procedure clearly did not provide a speedy and
efficient remedy, Congress noted that courts previously had held
that requiring multiple suits did not preclude the availability of an
adequate state remedy.32 In addition, testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce pointed out that state courts typically
have over-crowded dockets and move more slowly. 33 Congress,

therefore, determined that a grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts would provide efficient forums in which plaintiffs could acquire a complete remedy in one judicial proceeding. Congress also
recognized the need to provide standards to guide state and federal
courts in their review of allegedly discriminatory state and local
property taxes. The various provisions of 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503,
11503a, and 1513(d) supply these standards.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL

CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Decisions upholding the congressional power to regulate state
and local tax policy have involved the commerce clause, the tenth
amendment, and the supremacy clause. Of the three, only decisions under the supremacy clause have proven to be a threat to
congressional authority.3 4 This Note, however, concludes that state
court decisions upholding supremacy clause challenges to the fed35
eral legislation are mistaken.

A. The Commerce Clause
Congress enacted all three of the relevant statutes pursuant to
the commerce clause36 of the United States Constitution. The
31.

See H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1975) (observing that Southern

Pacific had to bring 48 lawsuits in different California courts to challenge its property assessments); S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1975) (citing Chicago & North W.
Ry. v. Lyons, 148 F. Supp. 787 (S.D. Ill.
1957) (holding that the requirement to bring 24
different suits was not a failure to provide an adequate state remedy)). But see Georgia R.R.
& Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303 (1952) (suit in 14 counties to protect a single
claim not satisfying the requirements of the Tax Injunction Act), cited with approval in

Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 517 (1981).
33. S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (testimony by a witness for the
Association of American Railroads).
34. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
36. The commerce clause provides that Congress shall have the power "[rio regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
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United States Supreme Court has ruled that, under the commerce
clause, "Congress may regulate any activities except 'those which
are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.' -. 7 Thus, Congress has the power to regulate a state's taxation of interstate rail, motor, and air carrier property located
totally within that state because of its potential impact on interthese circumstances, state tax laws bestate commerce.38 Under
39
come a federal concern.

Although Congress has broad powers under the commerce
clause, it still must act constitutionally in exercising those powers.
In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead4 0 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute, analogous to sections 11503, 11503a, 1513(d), that Congress enacted pursuant to
the commerce clause. The statute invalidated a New Mexico energy tax that discriminated against electricity sold outside the
state. Applying a rational basis test, the Court held that Congress
did have a rational basis for enacting the antidiscrimination law
and that the law was reasonably structured to fulfill its purpose.4
Under the Snead standard, sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d)
clearly are constitutional. Congress had a rational concern that discriminatory state and local property taxation unreasonably burdened interstate commerce and the provisions of the federal statutes established a reasonable method to eliminate the
discriminatory taxing scheme.42
B. The Tenth Amendment
States and local taxing authorities have argued that the tenth
amendment43 establishes a constitutional limitation on Congress'
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
37. Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. Co., 656 F.2d 398, 407 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964)).
38. See id.
39. See supra note 9.
40. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
41. Id.at 150; see also Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206-07
(M.D. Tenn. 1979) (discussing Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
42.

See supra notes 6-33 and accompanying text.

43.

The tenth amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United

States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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power to enact sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d). 4 The tenth
amendment prohibits Congress from acting in a way "that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system. '45 Taxation obviously is a principal way by which
state and local governments acquire the revenue necessary to function and to provide public services to their citizens. State taxation
of property used in interstate commerce, however, is not within the
traditional sovereignty of the states. 4' Consequently, because of
Congress' well-established powers to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress' prohibition on discriminatory state and local taxation of
interstate rail, motor, and air carrier property does not violate the
reasonable expectations of the states. 7 Furthermore, states do not
necessarily have to suffer a decline in tax revenues as a result of
the federal statutes. The states simply could eliminate discriminatory taxing schemes and assess all commercial and industrial property at the same ratio to true market value as the property of interstate carriers. 48
Lower court decisions rejecting tenth amendment challenges
to the federal statutes came during a period when the Supreme
Court generally employed a balancing approach in its tenth
amendment analysis.' 9 This balancing approach was established in
National League of Cities v. Usery.5 0 Under the National League
44. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. Co., 656 F.2d 398, 407-09 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding no tenth amendment violation); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 552 F.
Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Kan. 1982) (rejecting a tenth amendment challenge), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984); Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F.
Supp. 199, 205-06 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (holding no tenth amendment violation), af['d mem.,
652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
45, Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
46. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 408 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. See id.
48, See id. & n.9; see also Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206
(M.D. Tenn. 1979) (pointing out that § 11503 does not limit the amount of tax revenues that
a state can collect, but only prohibits discriminatory methods), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
49. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 407-09 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); Tennessee v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 205-06 (M. D. Tenn. 1979) (citing National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)), ai'd
mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981). These courts point out that
the applicability of the five to four decision in National League of Cities to cases challenging the constitutionality of § 11503 is uncertain and, therefore, they rely more on several of
the Court's earlier decisions.
50. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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of Cities approach, the balance of relevant interests clearly favors
federal legislation prohibiting the unreasonable burdening of interstate commerce, a significant national concern. Furthermore, the
states do not experience any loss of their sovereignty or their ability to govern effectively. 5 ' Not surprisingly, therefore, every court
that has considered a tenth amendment challenge to the federal
statutes has upheld their constitutionality. 52 Recently, however, in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authoritys3 the Supreme Court revised its tenth amendment analysis. Overruling National League of Cities, the Court held that because the American
political process enables states to participate in federal lawmaking,
Congress will not enact laws that unreasonably burden the states."
Under this new constitutional approach, courts are even less likely
to invalidate any federal statute, including sections 11503, 11503a,
and 1513(d), that survived challenge under the more strict and unpredictable balancing test of Usery.55
C.

The Supremacy Clause

The supremacy clause 56 preempts any provision of state or local tax law that conflicts with sections 11503, 11503a, or 1513(d).5
Federal courts consistently have upheld the congressional power to
enact these statutes, and have preserved their supremacy when the
courts have found that state and local taxing policies violated the
federal statutes."8 State courts, by contrast, have a greater ten51. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 408 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. See, e.g., Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984); Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199
(M.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
53. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
54. Id. at 1020-21.
55. See id. at 1022 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's opinion "effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant
to the Commerce Clause").
56. The supremacy clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

57. See Tennessee V. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 209 (M.D. Tenn. 1979),
affd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 511 F. Supp. 553, 557-58
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (stating that § 11503 preempts discriminatory state tax law), modified, 697
F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1983); Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 209 (M.D.
Tenn. 1979) (upholding supremacy of federal law), afl'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
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dency to guard jealously the rights of states to tax all property
59
within their borders and not to defer to Congress.
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County"0 the Supreme
Court of South Dakota demonstrated this position by reaffirming
an earlier South Dakota decision holding that "absent the clear
and manifest intent of Congress, the reserved powers of the States
are not superseded by federal legislation."'" The court concluded
that Congress had not expressed a clear and manifest intent when
it enacted section 1513(d) and, therefore, ruled that the discriminatory state tax scheme was not preempted. 2
The South Dakota court is mistaken. Any court, either federal
or state, must totally disregard nearly two decades of legislative
history to hold that Congress' intent to preempt discriminatory
state and local taxation of interstate rail, motor, and air carrier
property was not "clear and manifest."6 3 The supremacy clause
clearly operates to supersede all state and local taxation statutes
that conflict with the three federal statutes.
IV. AN

OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTES

In sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d), Congress enumerated
the means by which courts can prevent the unreasonable burdening of interstate commerce through discriminatory state and local
property taxation against rail, motor, and air carriers. First, each
statute contains a subsection defining key terms as well as acts
that constitute discrimination. Discrimination against a carrier occurs when a state or local government: (1) assesses the carrier's
transportation property at a higher ratio to true market value than
59. See State v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 408 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Apache
County v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970).
60. 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1985) prob. juris. noted, 106 S.Ct. 1180 (1986).
61. Id, at 108 (quoting Lead-Deadwood School Dist. v. Lawrence County, 334 N.W.2d
24, 25 (S.D. 1983)).
62. Id. But see id. at 111-12 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part) (severely criticizing the
majority's holding that § 1513(d) does not preempt South Dakota's airline property tax);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bair, 338 N.W.2d 338, 348 (Iowa 1983) (upholding § 11503 over
Iowa law in accordance with the supremacy clause), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984).
63. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 358 N.W.2d 515, 517
(N.D. 1984) (holding that § 1513(d) indicates that Congress "clearly" intended to preempt
North Dakota's airline property tax); see also Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation,
464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983) (stating that "when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States
to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, courts need
not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted") (footnote omitted). See generally L. TRIE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242-44 (1978) (discussing judicial review of congressional
legislation under the commerce clause).
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the assessment ratio of other commercial and industrial property
in the same assessment jurisdiction; (2) levies or collects a tax on a
discriminatory assessment; or (3) levies or collects an ad valorem
property tax at a higher tax rate than other commercial and industrial property." The definitions of "assessment jurisdiction" 5 and
"commercial and industrial property '6' contained in the statutes
have received varying interpretations among courts construing the
statutes. Second, the rail carrier statute prohibits the imposition of
any other discriminatory tax and the air carrier statute permits,
under certain circumstances, an in lieu tax, but the statutes do not
define these terms.6 7 Third, the rail and motor carrier statutes create an express exception to the Tax Injunction Act e8 by conferring
jurisdiction on federal courts, concurrent with state courts, to
grant relief6 9 when the assessment ratio of a carrier's property exceeds the assessment ratio of other commercial and industrial
property "by at least five percent. '7 0 Finally, these statutes provide
that a plaintiff may prove discrimination through a "sales assess64. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(b), 11503a(b), and 1513(d)(1) (1982).
65. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(a)(2), 11503a(a)(2), and 1513(d)(2)(B) (1982) define "assessment jurisdiction" as "a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value
of property for ad valorem taxation."
Under these definitions, an entire state or each county within a state may be considered
an assessment jurisdiction and tax exempt business property may or may not be considered
commercial and industrial property. In the legislative history of the definition of "assessment jurisdiction," Congress recognized that cities and counties as well as the state may
serve as the relevant assessment jurisdiction and determined that courts should decide
which one to follow under the facts of each case. See S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
14-15 (1969) (amending S. 2289 by substituting "assessment jurisdiction" for the extremely
broad term "taxing district"). Courts generally have determined that the state is the relevant assessment jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398,
405 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the State of Arizona was the relevant "assessment jurisdiction" under the facts of the case); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, No. 81-1279, slip. op.
(D. Ariz. May 2, 1983) (holding that the state was the relevant assessment jurisdiction despite possible hardships on the counties resulting from this determination) (available on
LEXIS); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 531 F. Supp. 220, 231 (D. Kan. 1981) (holding
that the state was the relevant assessment jurisdiction for purposes of deciding a motion for
a preliminary injunction).
66. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(a)(4), 11503a(a)(4), and 1513(d)(2)(D) (1982) define "commercial and industrial property" as "property, other than transportation property and land used
primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial
use and subject to a property tax levy."
For an analysis of the judicial conflicts over the definition of "commercial and industrial property," see infra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 86-99, 105-22 and accompanying text.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
69. For a discussion of the types of relief available under these statutes, see infra
notes 228-98 and accompanying text.
70. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c) and 11503a(c) (1982).
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ment ratio study" or by demonstrating to the satisfaction of a
court that the assessment or tax rate on its own property is higher
than comparable property.7 1 The air carrier statute, by contrast,
does not have a provision giving federal courts concurrent jurisdiction or the authority to grant appropriate relief. Consequently, federal courts apparently do not have jurisdiction over these cases.
Sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d) prohibit both de jure and
de facto discrimination. De jure discrimination is defined as the
taxation or assessment of a rail, motor, or air carrier's property "at
a rate different from the average rate applied to other commercial
and industrial property. '72 State property tax classification systems are typical forms of de jure discrimination. 7 De facto discrimination, by contrast, is a statutorily significant difference in
the assessment ratio of carrier property when compared to the ratio for all other commercial and industrial property even though
the state tax law is facially valid. 74 De facto discrimination typically occurs when a state's reassessment procedures require the annual reappraisal of rail, motor, and air carrier property, but, for
example, require the reappraisal of residential and other commercial and industrial property only every eight years.7 5 As a conse71. See id. For an analysis of the application of these provisions, see infra notes 13072 and accompanying text.
72. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Ariz. 1983); see
also Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494, 497 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing de jure
discrimination), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984).
De jure discrimination against rail and motor carriers occurs when a state's failure to
include various types of property in the assessment ratio of all other commercial and industrial property in an assessment jurisdiction, property which it includes in a rail or motor
carrier's assessment ratio, results in an assessment rate for a rail or motor carrier that exceeds the average assessment rate of all other commercial and industrial property by at least
five percent. See id. This type of discrimination occurs against air carriers when the state's
law results in any assessment ratio variation that favors commercial and industrial taxpayers. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) with 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503 and 11503a. Unlike §§ 11503 and
11503a, § 1513(d) does not have a 5% excess requirement.
73. See Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (holding that § 11503 prohibits Tennessee's property tax classification system), aff'd mem., 652
F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981).
74. For rail and motor carriers, statutorily significant discrimination would occur when
the assessment ratio of rail or motor carrier property exceeds by at least five percent the
average assessment ratio of all other commercial and industrial property even though the
state tax law is facially valid. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237,
1243 (D. Ariz. 1983). For air carriers, de facto discrimination is defined as any difference in
assessment ratios to the disadvantage of air carriers despite the facial validity of the state
tax statute. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing North
Carolina's reassessment procedures and how they result in de facto discrimination against
railroads.).
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quence of this process, the interstate carriers pay higher taxes than
most other commercial and industrial taxpayers because their assessments reflect current increases in true market value while
delayed assessment of other property delays increases in their tax
assessments.7" De jure discrimination has characterized most of the
7
litigation under these statutes. 7
Based on these statutory provisions, courts have undertaken
the task of enforcing Congress' desire to eliminate discriminatory
state and local taxation of interstate transportation property and
the resulting burdens on interstate commerce with varying and
often conflicting results.
V.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTIONS

11503, 11503A, AND 1513(D)

A.

Recodification of the 4R Act

Although Congress passed the 4R Act in 1976, the Act did not
become effective for three years.78 Congress provided this period to
allow states to revise their discriminatory taxation policies in accordance with section 306 of the 4R Act.79 During this delay, Congress passed the Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978 and recodified section 306 at 49 U.S.C. § 11503. This recodification
resulted in significant substantive changes in the language of the
statute80 Whether a court follows the original language of the 4R
Act or the recodified version at section 11503 may determine the
outcome of a case.
76. See id.
77. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 785-86 & n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1981),
aff'd, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222 (8th
Cir. 1985) (de jure discrimination); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204 (8th
Cir.) (de jure discrimination), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Cochran, 546 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (de jure discrimination); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Louisiana State Tax Comm'n, 498 F. Supp. 418 (M.D. La. 1980) (de jure
discrimination).
78. The 4R Act became effective on February 5, 1979. See Historical and Revision
Notes accompanying 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982) (stating that § 11503 "is effective after February 4, 1979"); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
79. Section 306 of the 4R Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 26c. See H.R. REP. No. 725,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975); see also Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697
F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, No. 81-1279, slip op. at , (D. Ariz. May 2, 1983) (available on LEXIS).
80. Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 11503, 92 Stat.
1337, 1445-46. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 26c (1976) with 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1983). See generally
Historical and Revision Notes accompanying 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982) (explaining the
changes in the statutory language).
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The overwhelming majority of courts have resolved substantive conflicts between the two versions of the statute in favor of
the original version.8 1 These courts point to Congress' stated intention not to change the law substantively when it recodified section
306.82 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that because Congress amended the original section 306 language before the statute's effective date, the original version never became law.83 Therefore, this circuit alone follows the recodified version. 4
Instead of clarifying the discriminatory taxation provisions of
the 4R Act, Congress' 1978 revisions made the statute even more
confusing and less likely to result in uniform judicial construction.
The recodification and the predominant judicial approach to the
Act's provisions have created problems. Courts, however, would experience fewer constructional problems if they followed the
recodification rather than the original language at all times.8 5 If a
court chooses to uphold the original language over the recodified
language, then the court first must determine whether a conflict
81. See Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 762 F.2d 375, 377 (4th
Cir. 1983); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Department of Revenue, 736 F.2d 1495, 1496 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1984); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1497 (10th Cir. 1984); Southern Ry. V. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 523-24 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 128 n.1 (4th Cir.
1983); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 206 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1086 (1981); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 258 & n.2 (10th Cir.
1981).
82. See Revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 11503, 92
Stat. 1337, 1337, 1466 (preamble and legislative purpose); H.R. REP. No. 1395, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, 9, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3009, 3013, 3018 (stating that
courts should not construe a codification statute as substantively changing the law); see also
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir. 1981) (Senator Mark
Hatfield noted that "by enacting [this law] we are not making any new law; we are merely
making existing law more understandable.") (quoting 124 CoNG. REc. 16059-60 (1978)).
83. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 404, 410 (9th Cir. 1981);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 n.1 (D. Ariz. 1983).
In Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 862 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983),
the Ninth Circuit stated that it "will refer to the original language of § 306 only when
necessary to assist in the interpretation of the statute." This statement should not be inferred to overrule implicitly the Ninth Circuit's 1981 holding, supra, that only the recodified
version became the law because similar language appeared in the earlier opinion. Instead,
this statement merely indicates that the court will compare, as part of its analysis, the original and current laws when the differences are relevant. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that the court-will cite to the recodified
version "except when the differences between the two are at issue").
84. Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1981).
85. Although uniformity among courts is generally encouraged and desired, the near
unanimity among the circuits to follow the original § 306 language when a conflict exists
with the recodification has the potential to create problems for the development of a uniform construction of § 11503.
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exists before it can apply the provisions of the relevant version.
This two step process results in courts disagreeing about the
threshold issue: whether a conflict even exists. Consequently, two
statutes, largely similar but different in several significant respects,
govern the law in the area of discriminatory state and local taxation of the rail carrier industry. Thus, to avoid confusion, the most
appropriate role for the original language is to provide guidance, as
legislative history, for interpreting section 11503's ambiguous provisions and to provide substance when apparently necessary provisions are omitted from section 11503.
B.

Scope of the Statutes
1.

Rail Carriers

Federal district courts and appellate courts have taken conflicting positions on the scope of section 11503.86 The appellate
court approach, favoring a broad application of the statute, has
prevailed. 7 Both statutory interpretations, nevertheless, are viable
and merit consideration. Several district courts 8 have limited section 11503 to prohibit only property tax discrimination against rail
carriers, The title of section 11503--"Tax discrimination against
rail transportation property"-itself suggests a restricted application of the statute to property tax discrimination." In addition,
each provision of section 11503 explicitly pertains to property taxation except subsection (b)(4), which is silent regarding its scope.9 0
The legislative history of section 11503 also demonstrates that the
statute apparently applies only to discriminatory property taxes. 1
86. The source of this controversy is subsection (b)(4) of 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982).
This subsection provides, in relevant part, that "a State, subdivision of a State, or authority
acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not. . . impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title." (emphasis added).
87. The consensus among the appellate courts regarding the proper interpretation of §
11053(b)(4) is welcome because it promotes some uniformity despite the many disagreements that characterize judicial construction of the other provisions in the statute. Cf. supra
note 85 (noting that near-unanimous approach of appellate courts to recodification of the
statute actually promotes a lack of uniformity in result).
88. See infra notes 93-94.
89. 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982); see Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 501 F. Supp.
1044, 1045 (M.D. Ala. 1980), rev'd, 663 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1981).
90. 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982).
91. Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 501 F. Supp. 1044, 1045-46 (M.D. Ala. 1980),
rev'd, 663 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1981).
The court quoted the following language from the "Joint Explanatory Statements of
the Committee of Conference" to support this conclusion:
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Finally, subsection (b)(4) is not without purpose even if courts
limit the provision's applicability to cases involving discriminatory
property taxation. e2 Thus, according to the strict constructionist
view, no validity exists for the argument that Congress included
subsection (b)(4) as a "catch-all" for all forms of tax discrimination.9 3 As a result, the district courts have held that allegedly discriminatory state income and license taxes are not within the jurisdiction of section 11503.1"
On the other hand, the federal appellate courts and a few district courts considering the issue have concluded that the statute
9 5
prohibits all types of discriminatory taxation against rail carriers.
According to these courts, section 11503 would be ineffective in
fulfilling Congress' intent to revitalize the railroad industry if
states could discriminate against rail carriers through non-property
The conference substitute follows the Senate bill except that the conferees deleted
the provision making this section inapplicable to any State which had, on the date of
enactment, a constitutional provision for the reasonable classification of property for
State purposes and limited the provision to taxation of railroadproperty.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 166, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 148, 181 (emphasis added)); see also Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of
Taxation, 591 F. Supp. 209, 223 (E.D. Va. 1984) (holding that the legislative history of
§ 11503 indicates Congress' intention that the statute apply only to property tax discrimination), modified, 762 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1985); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 492 F.
Supp. 446, 454 (D.N.D. 1980) (stating that the congressional intent in passing § 11503 "was
to protect interstate rail carriers from discriminatory property taxation") (emphasis added),
af'd, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
92. See Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 446, 453-55 (D.N.D. 1980),
aff'd, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981). The court invoked subsection (b)(4) and held that the state's taxation of railroad property was discriminatory because the state's method, in effect, taxed the personal property of the railroads but not ot
locally assessed businesses.
93. See Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 591 F. Supp. 209, 223
(E.D. Va. 1984), modified, 762 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1985).
94. See id. at 225 (denying relief because, according to the court, an action challenging
Virginia's allegedly discriminatory income tax was not within the court's jurisdiction under
§ 11503); Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Eagerton, 501 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (M.D. Ala. 1980)
(denying declaratory and injunctive relief because an action challenging Alabama's allegedly
discriminatory license taxes was not within the court's jurisdiction under § 11503), rev'd,
663 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1981).
95. See Trailer Train Co. v. Bair, 765 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1985); Richmond, F. & P.
R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 762 F.2d 375, 379-80 (4th Cir. 1985); Trailer Train Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 710 F.2d 468, 472 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1983); Alabama Great S. R.R. v.
Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1981); see also Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization,
657 F.2d 204, 210 (8th Cir.) (noting that the purpose of § 11503 "was to prevent tax discrimination against railroads in any form whatsoever") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1086 (1981); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bair, 338 N.W.2d 338, 344-46 (Iowa 1983) (invalidating a state railroad excise tax pursuant to § 11503), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984).
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taxes.96 To reach this interpretation requires courts to construe the
absence of any limitation to section 11503(b)(4) as indicating that
Congress intended a broad application of the statute. 97 Similarly,
the failure of the legislative history to explain the purpose of subsection (b)(4) indicates, according to this argument, that Congress
did not intend to limit the statute to prohibiting only property tax
discrimination.' These courts, therefore, have concluded that discriminatory state income, franchise, and license taxes, as well as
any other type of discriminatory tax, are within the jurisdiction of
section 11503.11
2.

Motor Carriers

Although essentially identical to section 11503 in all respects,
section 11503a does not have a provision equivalent to subsection
(b)(4). All of the section 11503a provisions relate to property tax
discrimination against motor carriers. Nevertheless, constructional
disputes may arise concerning the applicability of the statute to
other forms of tax discrimination. The brief legislative history of
the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 indicates that Congress did not intend to limit section 11503a to prohibiting discriminatory property
96. See Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 710 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir.
1983); Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1981).
97. See Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 762 F.2d 375, 379 (4th
Cir. 1985) (concluding that Congress intended a broad application of the statute).
98. See id. at 380 (holding that "[i]t is entirely reasonable to conclude that the legislative history is silent as to the purpose of § [11503(b)(4)] because that subsection, inserted
three weeks before the statute's passage, represented a last minute realization by Congress
that prohibiting only discriminatory property taxes would not be enough relief"); Alabama
Great S. R.R. v.Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that Congress must
have realized, as debate over the 4R Act was concluding, that a catch-all provision was necessary to assure fulfillment of the statutory purpose).
Although the appellant railroads in Alabama Great Southern contended that the legislative history cited by the district court, supra note 91, was irrelevant and did not stand for
the proposition stated, the Eleventh Circuit failed to address that issue. See id at 1039. The
railroads argued that the legislative history did not limit § 11503(b)(4) to railroad transportation property, but rather limited the statute's scope to railroads instead of expansively
applying it to other interstate carriers. Id.
99. See Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 762 F.2d 375, 380 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that an action challenging Virginia's allegedly discriminatory net income
tax is under a court's § 11503 jurisdiction); Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d
1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that an action challenging Alabama's allegedly discriminatory franchise tax is under a court's § 11503 jurisdiction); Kansas City S. R.R. v. McNamara, 563 F. Supp. 199, 200 (M.D. La. 1983) (holding that an action challenging Louisiana's
allegedly discriminatory license tax is under a court's § 11503 jurisdiction); see also Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bair, 535 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (holding that Iowa's
special excise tax on railway fuel is within the "another tax" provision of § 11503(b)(4)).
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taxes. 10 0 Rather, Congress intended the section to encompass taxes
that are part of the "general tax structure applicable to a variety of
commodities, operations, and commercial activities.'' 1 This history, however, enumerates other types that are not within the
0 2
scope of the statute.1
Despite the conflict between Congress' intentions as stated in
the legislative history of section 11503a and the language of the
statute as codified, no court has attempted to resolve this dispute.
In the two cases in which plaintiffs raised section 11503a and alleged that states were discriminating against interstate motor carriers through tax measures other than property taxes, the decisions
were based on alternate grounds. 03 If states, however, can impose
other types of discriminatory taxes, 0 4 they can subvert Congress'
efforts through section 11503a to protect the motor carrier industry. For these reasons, courts should rule that the scope of section
11503a is coextensive with the expressed legislative intent.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1980 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 2283, 2327.
101.

Id.

102. As Congress stated:
The prohibition in this section against different tax rates is intended to apply to
taxes such as those on real or personal property, general sales taxes, or other levies that
are parts of general tax structure applicable to a variety of commodities, operations,
and commercial activities. The provisions of this section do not apply to that body of
taxes known as highway user taxes that are levied on owners or operators of motor
vehicles because of their use of public highways. These highway user taxes include, but
are not limited to, motor fuel taxes, registration fees, driver licenses, vehicle user taxes,
ton-mile taxes, and other motor vehicle related taxes; the proceeds of these taxes, for
the most part, are expended through a State highway fund or otherwise earmarked for
highway construction, maintenance, or operation.
Id.
103. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. O'Neill, 522 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1981) (concerning the amendment of a Connecticut statute requiring each interstate motor carrier to
pay a $40, rather than a $5, annual registration fee); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway,
514 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Vt. 1981) (concerning amendments to Vermont statutes requiring
interstate motor carriers to pay increased permit fees).
Both courts held that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, applied to the cases at
bar. If the courts, however, had concluded that § 11503a was pertinent, the Tax Injunction
Act would have been irrelevant because § 11503a(c) provides an explicit exception to that
jurisdictional limitation. Although these courts probably did not apply § 11503a because
registration fees were involved, see supra note 102, the decisions did not provide any reasoning for their failure to apply § 11503a.
104. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text; see also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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3. Air Carriers
Like section 11503a, section 1513(d) does not contain a provision analogous to section 11503(b)(4). Although most of the statute's provisions specifically apply to the property of air carriers,
subsection (d)(3), nevertheless, will likely cause constructional disputes. First, this subsection states that it "shall not apply to any in
lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,"' 10 5 but then fails to define the term "in lieu tax." The supreme courts of South Dakota and North Dakota have been the
only courts to consider this issue.10 In Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Hughes County, 07 the Supreme Court of South Dakota defined
"in lieu tax" as meaning "instead of, or, a substitute for, and...
not an additional tax."' 08 Based upon this definition, the court
concluded that the South Dakota tax was not a substitute tax, but
rather was the state's first levy of a personal property tax on the
plaintiff's airline flight property. 0 9 The court observed that even
though the South Dakota statute labeled itself "in lieu," the substance, not the name, of the statute was determinative. 10 The
court, therefore, noted that the relevant subsection of the act was
(d)(1)"' and not (d)(3). 12 The court, nevertheless, concluded that
section 1513(d)(1) did not preempt the South Dakota tax.13 In
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization"14 the Supreme Court of North Dakota similarly held that North Dakota's
personal property tax on air carrier transportation property was
not an in lieu tax under section 1513(d)(3) because the state had
enacted no other tax for which this tax could be considered a substitute." 5 The court, however, determined that section 1513(d)(1)
preempted the North Dakota tax."06 The scant legislative history
105. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
106. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1985), prob.
juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984).
107. 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1984), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986).

108. Id. at 109 (quoting

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY

832 (5th ed. 1979)).

109. Id.
110. Id. Thus, the court found no statutory violation.
111. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d)(1) (1982). This provision specifies which state or local government actions unreasonably burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. For enumeration of these actions, see supra text accompanying note 64.
112. 372 N.W. at 109.
113. Id. at 111.
114. 358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984).
115. Id. at 518.
116. Id.
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on section 1513(d) provides no assistance in defining an "in lieu
tax" in the context of this statute. Instead, the legislative history
may create even more confusion.
The second likely dispute concerning construction of section
1513(d) is over its scope. The legislative history indicates Congress
intended to equate section 1513(d) with section 11503a. 111 As discussed above, however, the scope of section 11503a is not without
its own constructional problems. 118
The interrelationship of the various provisions of section 1513,
however, suggests the need for an expansive reading of subsection
(d). For example, section 1513(b), if read literally, demonstrates
that states easily can circumvent the restrictions of subsection (d).
Subsection (b), limited only by subsections (a) and (d)," 9 provides
that states may levy or collect "property taxes, net income taxes,
franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services."120 If the courts, therefore, restrict subsection (d) to prohibiting only property tax discrimination, a state apparently can discriminate against air carriers through various taxes other than
property taxes. Arguably, Congress intended that the prohibition
against unreasonably burdening interstate commerce, as embodied
in subsection (d), be extended to the taxes enumerated in subsection (b), or taxes which that subsection contemplates."' The fact
that states may disguise their property taxes in other forms dem1 22
onstrates the need for a broad application of section 1513(d).
117. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, Vol. 2, 1188.
118. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
119. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) provides in pertinent part that "[n]o state. . . shall levy or
collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in
air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce, or on the sale of air
transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom."
49 U.S.C. § 1513(d), on its face, prohibits only property taxes that unreasonably burden
and discriminate against interstate commerce. A failure to interpret this statute broadly has
resulted in air carriers paying taxes that other carriers do not have to pay. See Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1984) (not raising § 1513(d), the
court upheld Florida's sales tax on fuel purchased by interstate air carriers even though the
state did not tax railroads similarly).
120. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1982). This subsection also provides that states may levy or
collect "reasonable rental charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities." Id. (emphasis added).
121. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
122. The problems associated with a strict interpretation of 1513(d) may be highlighted by looking to other code provisions with only limited breadth. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized and invalidated Hawaii's attempt to enact a
gross receipts tax prohibited by 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a). The fact that Hawaii "styled" the gross
receipts tax as a property tax did not make the tax legal. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director
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C. Burden of Proof
As in other types of litigation, the level of a plaintiff's burden
of proof in an action arising under sections 11503, 11503a, and
1513(d) often will be outcome determinative. Under sections 11503
and 11503a, "[t]he burden of proof in determining assessed value
and true market value is governed by State law. '123 Similarly, state
burden of proof laws also govern cases tried in state court pursuant
to section 1513(d), which does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. 124 Congress' failure to establish a federal burden of
proof standard for use in these cases may foster a lack of national
uniformity in the judicial construction of these statutes and may
ultimately defeat Congress' purpose in enacting these laws. Without a federal standard, jurisdictions may adopt conflicting burden
of proof requirements. For example, a plaintiff bringing an action
in federal court, challenging a Kansas property tax law under sections 11503 or 11503a, may have to prove discrimination by clear
and convincing evidence. 125 In a similar lawsuit in federal court in
Iowa, by contrast, that same plaintiff would have the burden to
26
prove discrimination only by a preponderance of the evidence.1
Thus, plaintiffs apparently will prevail more often under the federal interpretation of Iowa law than Kansas law. In addition, the
burden of proof never shifts to the state in an action governed by
Iowa law, 127 but the burden does shift to the state in a suit
brought, for instance, under North Carolina law. 128 States could
of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 13 (1983). The Court did not consider § 1513(d) because Congress
enacted this statute "after the relevant periods." Id. at 10 n.3. The factual situation in
Aloha Airlines is particularly relevant because states could attempt to evade § 1513(d) by
similarly disguising their property taxes as well as their gross receipts taxes.
123. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c) and 11503a(c) (1982).
124. See 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (1982).
125. In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Kan. 1982), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984), the district court, in a § 11503 case,
held that Kansas law required a clear and convincing evidence standard. 552 F. Supp. at
1051 (apparently relying on Northern Natural Gas v. Williams, 208 Kan. 407, 430, 493 P.2d
568, 587 (1972) (Fatzer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the proper Kansas standard was a preponderance of the evidence,
but the appellate court sustained the district court's ruling on the merits. 732 F.2d at 1500
& n.4 (citing In re Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951)).
126. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying
Iowa's burden of proof standards in a case concerning the railroad's challenge to the state's
allegedly discriminatory personal property tax scheme).
127. See id. (citing Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Iowa St. Bd. of Tax Review,
368 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1985)).
128. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-333 through 105-341).
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even increase the burden of proof required to prevail in these actions because their laws establish the governing standard. 12 9 These
differences undermine the chances for a uniform judicial construction of these statutes.
D. Proving Discrimination Under the Statutes
1. Sales Assessment Ratio Studies
Under sections 11503 and 11503a, plaintiffs may prove property tax discrimination through a method known as a "sales assessment ratio study."' 3 0 The purpose of this study is to calculate the
assessments of a "hypothetical 'average' taxpayer," which a court
then compares with a rail or motor carrier plaintiff's tax assessments in determining whether discrimination exists. 3 1 When the
plaintiff's assessment ratio exceeds the "hypothetical taxpayer's"
assessment ratio by at least five percent, a court may grant relief. 32 Although several courts have concluded that the sales assessment ratio study is the method Congress prefers in determining the average assessed value of other commercial and industrial
129. States are unlikely to take this action because Congress would certainly respond
unfavorably in its disbursement of funds to those states. Furthermore, such a development
would force Congress into establishing a burden of proof standard for actions arising under
these statutes. But cf. Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that Congress intended the civil standard to apply).
130. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c) and 11503a(c) (1982). One court has concisely defined
this method:
The sales assessment ratio study is a statistical study used to measure the average
ratio of market value to assessed value of locally-assessed property within a tax jurisdiction. The method of the study is randomly to select recently sold properties and to
compare the sales prices with the assessed values. This composite of randomly-selected
properties can provide, within a margin of error, the average ratio of market value to
assessed value of property in the jurisdiction.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 n.2 (D. Ariz. 1983); see also
Louisville and N. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 493 F. Supp. 162, 164 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. 1978)
(defining the sales assessment ratio study), aff'd, 631 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981).
Plaintiffs can conduct their own sales assessment ratio study or use a study already
prepared. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1049 (D. Kan. 1982),
aff'd in part and reu'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
The air carrier statute does not provide a method by which plaintiffs can prove tax
discrimination. The legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended § 1513(d)
to be analogous to § 11503a. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 781, 1188. Under these circumstances, Congress may have
intended that air carrier plaintiffs use this statistical method.
131. See S. REi
132. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c) and 11503a(c) (1982).
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property, other methods of calculation are permissible. 133 A sales
assessment ratio study merely establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. When a party challenges the accuracy or methodology
of the study, a court may grant relief only if satisfied that the
plaintiff has proven discrimination regardless of the study's
outcome.

1 34

Courts as well as litigants have disagreed over whether a sales
assessment ratio study should include both personal and real property. A study that includes only real property is more efficient because information on arms length transactions of real property is
readily available. 13 5 Personal property, on the other hand, cannot
be studied through arms length transactions because the parties
generally do not keep statistical records.3 6 As a result, railroad
plaintiffs have argued that a study on personal property is impossible. Defendants, by contrast, contend that a sales assessment ratio
31
study is incomplete without statistics on personal property.1
Some district courts have held that Congress determined that a
proper sales assessment ratio study includes only real property and
selected this statistical method for determining tax discrimination
because of the method's speed and efficiency. 38 According to these
133. Compare Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (D. Ariz.
1983) (stating that the sales assessment ratio study is the "preferred method") and Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (stating that "Congress incorporated [a] preference for a sales-assessment ratio study into Section [11503]"), aff'd, 700 F.2d
126, 129 & nn.3-4 (4th Cir. 1983) with Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 446,
451 (D.N.D. 1980) (stating that the legislative history "does not indicate" that the sales
assessment ratio study is the only allowable method), afl'd, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
134. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 789-90 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd,
700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
135. See id. at 787-88 & n.7.
136. Id. at 788 n.7. The court, however, pointed out that a study on personal property
is feasible, but only through more time-consuming appraisals and field reports. Id.
137. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1042-44 (D. Kan.
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984); Clinchfield R.R. v.
Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 787-88 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afl'd, 700 F.2d 126, 133 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983)
(pointing out that a study on personal property would likely benefit plaintiffs).
Plaintiffs in Lennen apparently argued that sales assessment ratio studies of personal
property would be too costly and unreliable. Plaintiffs, therefore, were willing to follow the
real estate study results even if a personal property study would lower the assessment ratio.
Defendants, on the other hand, apparently believed that plaintiffs could not obtain relief if
they did not undertake a study on personal property.
138. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 787 (E.D.N.C. 1981), af'd on
other grounds, 700 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1983). The court cited the following congressional
hearings to support its analysis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (July 1964); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aeronautics of the Comm. on Inter-
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courts, Congress was willing to sacrifice a certain degree of accuracy for a speedier process.13 9 Appellate courts considering this issue have disagreed with the analysis of these courts. Appellate
courts note that because Congress has prohibited discrimination
concerning both personal and real property, only a study of personal property can demonstrate discrimination in that aspect of a
tax scheme. 140 Appellate courts, however, have held that plaintiffs
can use methods less laborious and expensive than a sales assessment ratio study to prove personal property discrimination.14 1
Courts have taken various approaches in deciding whether a
state that exempts the personal property of all other commercial
and industrial taxpayers may properly include a carrier's personal
property in its assessment ratio. The diversity in court decisions
stems from the definitions of "commercial and industrial property"
in sections 11503, 11503a and 1513(d). Each definition provides
that only property "subject to a property tax levy" constitutes
commercial and industrial property. 42 Under one approach, only
rail carriers could receive an exemption for personal property taxes
because section 11503(b)(4) prohibits a state from taxing a rail carrier's personal property if the state does not impose a tax on similar commercial and industrial property. 1 43 Motor and air carriers
state and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 736, H.R. 10169, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Hearings
on S. 2289 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportationof the Comm. on Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Id. See also Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp.
1031, 1043-44 (D. Ken. 1982) (pointing out the efficiency of a sales assessment ratio study
conducted only on real property), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.
1984).
Congress has stated that the results of a sales assessment ratio study, including data
only on real property, "can be statistically demonstrated to be accurately representative of

the level of assessment of all other property in the geographical area (i.e., taxing district)
represented by the sample." S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1969).
139. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (D. Kan. 1982) (holding that "Congress could not have intended to burden plaintiffs with the task of conducting
extensive and unprecedented personal property studies when its announced intent was to
ease procedural barriers to relief"), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir.
1984); Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 788 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (holding that "Congress necessarily sacrificed a degree of accuracy which could be obtained through a vastly
more expensive and time-consuming method of proof, that of county-by-county personal
property studies") (footnote omitted), aff'd on other grounds, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
140. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1502-04 (10th Cir. 1984);
Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 133-34 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1983).
141. These methods include appraisal studies and expert testimony. Clinchfield R.R.
v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 1983).
142. See 49 U.S.C. § 11503(a)(4), 11503a(a)(4), and 1513(d)(2)(D) (1982).
143. See Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 710 F.2d 468, 471-73 (8th Cir.
1983); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 446, 453-55 (D.N.D. 1980), af/'d,
657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
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would have to pay personal property taxes because sections 11503a
and 11503(d) do not have analogous provisions. 144 In addition, tax
exempt personal property of locally assessed businesses is ineligible for comparison with motor and air carrier personal property
because that property, by definition, is not included in the assessment ratio of the average taxpayer. 4 5 Under a second approach,
courts have concluded that tax exempt business inventories are not
within the definition of commercial and industrial property and
cannot be used for comparison. 146 Thus, unless rail, motor, or air
carriers have business inventories similar to other commercial and
industrial taxpayers, they receive no exemption from personal
property taxes. 47 Finally, under a third approach, when other
commercial and industrial taxpayers are exempt from personal
property taxes, motor and air carriers, as well as rail carriers, also
are exempt. 4 8 This approach avoids the "absurd" result of the first
approach-that motor and air carriers could obtain relief from discrimination when the state taxes other businesses' personal property at a very low rate, but not when that personal property is
149
exempt.
Courts as well as litigants also have disagreed over how to include public utility property in a sales assessment ratio study. Including public utility property in the study avoids the problems
associated with including personal property because (1) the total
assessed value of the property is known, and (2) the property's assessment ratio is one hundred percent. 50 Under the standard procedures for conducting a proper sales assessment ratio study, however, public utility property would be excluded despite its
inclusion in the statutory definition of commercial and industrial
144. See supra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
145. See Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 492 F. Supp. 446, 453-54 (D.N.D. 1980),
aff'd, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d 106, 111 (S.D. 1985) (adopting the Ogilvie district court's analysis in a case arising under § 1513(d)), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986).
146. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp. 1237, 1245 (D. Ariz. 1983);
Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 538 F. Supp. 509, 512 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(concerning alleged discrimination against rail transportation property and holding that
such a comparison would be like comparing "apples and oranges").
147. See id.
148. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 358 N.W.2d 515, 517-18
(N.D. 1984) (deciding this case under § 1513(d)).
149. See id.
150. Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afl'd, 700
F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031,
1044 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984) (relying
on and extensively quoting from the district court's opinion in Clinchfield, supra this note).
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property. 151 Courts, nevertheless, generally have agreed that a sales
152
assessment ratio study should include public utility property.
Courts as well as litigants also have disagreed over what
method of calculation to use when including public utility property
and other centrally assessed property in the study. The parties
may use either the "value weighted mean"1 53 approach or the "median" approach. 15 4 Although either method can determine the "average" taxpayer in the assessment jurisdiction, each leads to a significantly
different result because the approaches are
fundamentally different. Under the value weighted mean approach,
a court must determine the ratio of total assessed value to total
true market value of locally assessed commercial and industrial
real and personal property and state assessed public utility property. 55 The impact of public utility property on the assessment ra15 6
tio varies depending on its proportion of the total tax base.
States advocate the value weighted mean approach rather than the
median approach because the value weighted mean approach produces greater tax revenue.157 When public utility property constitutes a significant proportion of the tax base and a party uses the
value weighted mean approach in a sales assessment ratio study,
the assessment ratio of commercial and industrial property will be
much higher than if the party had used the median approach.
Under the median approach, by contrast, public utility property is
treated, regardless of its value, equally with all other property in
determining the assessment ratio. 158 Plaintiffs, including railroads,
151. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 788 (E.D.N.C. 1981); see also
Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 209 (8th Cir.) (observing that Congress
could have excluded public utility property from this definition, as it excluded agricultural
property, but because it did not, public utility property is included), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1086 (1981).
152. See, e.g., ACF Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1983); Ogilvie v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 657 F.2d 204, 209 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1044 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495, 1504 (10th Cir. 1984); Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F.
Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1983).
153. See infra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
155. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1504 (10th Cir. 1984).
156. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (discussing
the arguments of defendants in favor of the value weighted mean approach), aff'd, 700 F.2d
126 (4th Cir. 1983).
157. See id.; see also ACF Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1983)
(noting carlines' argument that the value weighted mean would result in much higher taxes).
158. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (discussing
the plaintiffs' arguments in favor of the median approach); see also ACF Indus., Inc. v.
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advocate the use of the median approach because, depending upon
how the median is calculated, 159 this method can result in a much
lower assessment ratio for other commercial and industrial property and, therefore, a much lower tax liability. When public utility
property is only one of many calculations in a median, the utility
property has little or no impact on the assessment ratio. Recent
decisions have favored the value weighted mean approach'"0 as the
most, appropriate method.'0 ' In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railway v. Lennen'6 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that the value weighted mean approach was
the favored method because "each category [of property] should be
factored in proportion to its share of the total true market value of
all such property.' 163 In Lennen, the court found that "parcels"
are not appropriate units of measurement and, therefore, property
consisting of a small farm and all the property of a public utility
should not be treated as equivalent individual parcels in calculating the average commercial and industrial taxpayer's assessment
ratio. 6 4 The court also found that the median approach was not
viable when the assessment ratio included "parcels" of both personal and real property.6 5 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit also has selected the value weighted mean approach, holding that taxpayers have the burden to prove that this
approach is discriminatory and not merely unpreferable because of
its more burdensome tax consequences. 1 66 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that Congress required the median approach,
holding that only the value weighted mean approach considers a
state's "legitimate" and "fundamental" interest in its tax classifiArizona, 714 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing plaintiffs' reasoning in favor of the
median approach).
159. If public utilities own many parcels in an assessment jurisdiction and these parcels are treated individually in the median calculation, rather than as one total unit, plaintiffs will not benefit nearly as much under this approach.
160. This method also has been termed the "mean aggregate" approach. See Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 527 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.N.C. 1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 126 (4th Cir.
1983).
161. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1504. The court pointed out that "[a] median has no significance if the
items on the continuum are not alike in some relevant way." 732 F.2d at 1504 (citing International Ass'n of Assessing Officers Assessment Standards Comm., Standard on Assessment
Ratio Studies § 3.10.3 (1980)).
164. 732 F.2d at 1504-05.
165. Id. at 1505.
166. ACF Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1983) (implying that the
value weighted mean approach complies with § 11503).
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cation system. 16 7
Before the value weighted mean approach's recent popularity,
other courts had adopted the median approach. In Clinchfield
Railroad v. Lynch, for example, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina favored the median approach, 16s determining that "Congress implicitly mandated the use
of a median to determine the average taxpayer."' 1 9 The district
court accepted plaintiffs' argument that the impact of public utility property on the sales assessment ratio study should be "insignificant. 1 70 The court also acknowledged that adoption of the median approach, rather than the value weighted mean approach,
would benefit the railroads. 171 Although the district court in Lennen quoted extensively from the Clinchfield opinion, an opinion
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, to support using the median approach, the Tenth Circuit subsequently reversed the Lennen decision, 172 thus creating conflict with the Fourth Circuit.
2.

The Valuation Process

Plaintiffs may prove that a state discriminates in its valuation
process as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, demonstrating
discrimination through a sales assessment ratio study.17 3 Some federal courts, however, have established considerable barriers to judicial review of a state's valuation process. 1 74 According to one view,
federal courts should not participate in the valuation of interstate
carrier property because Congress did not intend for them to do
so.'1 This approach permits an exception when a state purpose167. Id. (labeling plaintiff's argument that "the legislative history of § 11503 requires
the 'median' approach to the exclusion of others" as "self-serving").
168. 527 F. Supp. 784, 789 (E.D.N.C. 1981), afl'd, 700 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that the district court properly adopted the median approach).
169. Id.
170. See 527 F. Supp. at 789.
171. See id. at 789 n.9.
172. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1044-45 (D. Kan.
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1984).
173. See ACF Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 561 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D. Ariz. 1982) (pointing
out the two alternative methods of proving discriminatory state property taxation), afl'd,
714 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1983).
174. Because federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide cases concerning alleged
property tax discrimination against air carriers, air carrier plaintiffs also must seek valuation relief in state court.
175. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 573 F. Supp. 1155, 1164-65 (D. Kan. 1982)
(deciding, after considering the relevant legislative history, that federal courts should not
participate in the valuation of railroads), affd, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1067 (1984); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 498 F. Supp. 418, 421
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fully has overvalued a carrier's property in retaliation for relief
granted in a prior case. Under these circumstances, a court has jurisdiction to evaluate the state's valuation process under the
court's broad equity powers. 176 Under a second approach, plaintiffs
may sue for valuation relief in federal court irrespective of a retaliatory overvaluation, but they must make a "strong showing" that
the state acted purposefully and with discriminatory intent.177 This
standard presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs
because of the difficulties in proving that a state acted purposefully and intentionally to discriminate.178 Under a final approach,
federal courts may adjudicate valuation issues whether the dis1 79
crimination occurred either "purposefully or by honest error.'
Federal courts, according to this view, must make independent factual findings regarding the assessed and true market values of the
plaintiff's property, as well as all other commercial and industrial
taxpayers' property, to properly equalize assessment ratios and to
grant relief from overvaluation.'5 0
(M.D. La. 1980) (holding that states should determine "fair" or "true" market value under §
11503). But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 84-1554, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit from the Northern
District of California (submitted Mar. 1985) (arguing that "the district court misconstrued
the language, purpose, and legislative history of Section [11503] and erroneously concluded
that federal courts never have jurisdiction to award overvaluation relief").
176. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 573 F. Supp. 1155, 1165 (D. Kan. 1982) (stating that § 11503 confers "significant equity power to remedy discriminatory taxation"),
aff'd, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984).
177. See Burlington N. R.R., 715 F.2d at 498 (upholding Kansas' valuation of railroads' property because railroads did not satisfy their burden for relief). But see Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, No.
85-1657, on appeal to the Tenth Circuit from the Western District of Oklahoma (submitted
Nov. 1985) (urging Tenth Circuit to overrule its decision in Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen,
supra, en banc, citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (8th Cir. 1985),
and requesting the court to hold that "federal courts have jurisdiction under Section*[11503]
to prohibit discriminatory overvaluation of railroad property without regard to 'intent' ").
178. See Union Pacific R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 635 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Utah
1986). Although bound by Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, the court suggested that the Tenth
Circuit should reconsider that decision because its interpretation of § 11503 "may perpetuate discrimination against railroads by placing one leg of the caliper for measuring discrimination-valuation-firmly in the hands of the very party accused of discriminating (the
state)." Id. at 1067.
179. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222, 1225-27 (8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
argument of Iowa's Director of the Department of Revenue that § 11503 does not authorize
federal courts to review valuations); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 795 F.2d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "the 4-R Act authorizes federal
district courts to hear claims of specific instances of overvaluation in state tax assessment of
the true market value of rail transportation property").
180. See id. at 1226. All three approaches require a plaintiff to satisfy its burden of
proof, as governed by state law, to prevail. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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Rail carrier plaintiffs argue that section 11503 empowers federal courts to determine their property's true market value in an
action for relief from discriminatory taxation; states, however, contend that valuation falls outside federal court jurisdiction.' 8 ' Ironically, rail carriers initially contended that the federal statute protecting them from discriminatory taxation did not confer
jurisdiction on federal courts to review state valuations. In 1967,
during congressional hearings on a bill nearly identical to section
11503, a representative of the Association of American Railroads 182
stated that the proposed bill "is not a standard for determining
value; it is a standard to which values that have already been determined must be compared."' 18 3 In hearings on a similar bill two
years later, another representative of that organization stated that
"we are not dealing with the valuation question. This is not our
problem. We speak only of the equalization of the tax rate.'1 84
This original view of rail carriers is currently the states' position in
suits under section 11503.85 Equally ironic, the states originally argued that courts must decide valuation and assessment issues at
the same time.'8 8 The railroads now advocate this viewpoint.
7
E. Federal Court Abstention1

Federal courts have a responsibility to exercise jurisdiction
conferred on them by Congress and the United States Constitu181. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 573 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (D. Kan. 1982) (outlining railroad's argument that the "plain" statutory language of § 11503 requires federal
court involvement in the valuation process), aff'd, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984).
182. See supra note 19.
183. 573 F. Supp. at 1161-62 (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportation of the Comm. on Commerce on S. 927, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1967)
(statement by James N. Ogden, Vice President and General Counsel of the Gulf, Mobile and
Ohio R.R., on behalf of the Association of American Railroads) (emphasis added)).
184. Id. at 1162 (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation
of the Comm. on Commerce on S. 2289, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1969) (statement by Philip
M. Lanier, Vice President-Law, Louisville and Nashville R.R. on behalf of the Association of
American Railroads) (emphasis added)).
185. See id. at 1159-60 (detailing defendant's argument that federal courts have no
jurisdiction under § 11503 to review state valuations).
186. As the executive secretary of the National Association of Tax Administrators testified before Congress, "The matter of assessment levels cannot be considered apart from
the basic valuations put on properties of all kinds including railroad property." State Tax
Discrimination Against Interstate Carrier Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Surface Transportationof the Comm. on Commerce on S. 2289, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74
(1969) (testimony of Charles F. Conlon).
187. The abstention issue may not apply to air carriers because Congress apparently
has not granted jurisdiction to federal courts under § 1513(d). See supra notes 68-70 and
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tion. 185 Federal courts, nevertheless, occasionally have declined jurisdiction under the discretionary doctrine of abstention.8 9 The
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he doctrine of abstention ... is
an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."'19 0 The Court
has further determined that a federal court's "[a]bdication of the
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only
in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to
[litigate in] State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."1 9' This deference to state courts under limited
circumstances originates in the principle of comity, a belief that
the federal system functions best when the national government
recognizes the separate sphere of the states. 192
Challenges to state taxation policies are one area in which federal courts have been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction. 9 3 The Supreme Court has recognized that "the important and sensitive nature of state tax systems" requires federal jurisdictional
restraint.19 4 Congress acknowledged the need for such restraint
accompanying text. Courts, however, may hold that Congress intended the same jurisdictional grant under § 1513(d) as under § 11503a. Cf. supra note 117 and accompanying text;
infra notes 233, 252 and accompanying text (analogous reasoning regarding other § 1513(d)
issues). In that event, identical considerations would govern the possibility of abstention
under the air carrier statute.
188. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 314
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (quoting Bally Mfg. Corp. v. Casino Control Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 1213,
1215 (D.N.J. 1982)); see County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
189. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Tax. Div., 504 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Ark. 1980). The abstention doctrine is defined as the process "whereby the federal courts, 'exercising a wise
discretion,' restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 296, 501 (1941).
190. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959).
191. Id. at 188-89.
192. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Although Younger concerned a
criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has extended its application to civil suits. Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
193. See Fair Assessment In Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102-103
(1981).
194. Id. The Supreme Court observed the following over a century ago:
It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on
their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the
modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of
collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.
Id. at 102 (quoting Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871)).
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when it enacted the Tax Injunction Act in 1937. e5 Under this Act,
Congress prohibited federal courts from intruding into state taxation matters unless state remedies were inadequate.'9 6 Therefore,
although interstate transportation carriers experienced state tax
discrimination, the Tax Injunction Act generally barred federal
197
courts from asserting federal question jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has four recognized categories of abstention.198 First, a federal court may abstain from hearing a case when
it may become unnecessary to decide a federal constitutional issue
after a state court applies state law.'9 9 Second, abstention is proper
when a federal court decision on important state law issues would
inhibit the development of a consistent state policy. 0 0 Third, abstention is appropriate when federal courts cannot act without unreasonably interfering with legitimate state interests.20 1 These categories, promulgated in Supreme Court decisions, are commonly
known as the Pullman,Burford, and Younger abstention doctrines
respectively.2 02 Last, a federal court may abstain for reasons of judicial economy when state and federal courts have concurrent
195. See id. at 102-03. The Tax Injunction Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
197. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing applicability of the Tax Injunction Act); see also Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (holding that motor carriers had
a "plain, speedy, and efficient" state court remedy), af'd, 386 U.S. 262 (1967); Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 105 F. Supp. 188 (D. Neb. 1952)
(denying federal jurisdiction to an air carrier because a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
was available in state court).
198. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81418 (1976).
199. Id. at 814.
200. Id.
201. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see also supra note 192. Although
Younger concerned a criminal proceeding, the Court has extended its comity-based abstention principles to civil actions, including those actions regarding the collection of state taxes.
See Fair Assessment In Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1981); see
also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (noting that "[tihe component of
Younger which rests upon the threat to our federal system is [as] applicable to a civil proceeding . . . as it is to a criminal proceedings"); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977)
(stating that the doctrines enunciated in Younger and Huffman are not restricted to the
facts of those cases).
202. See North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311,
315 (N.D. Ind. 1984). These cases referred to are Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). Courts have considered these cases to represent the "three traditional forms of abstention." See North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311,
316 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
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Even without considering the impact of the express jurisdictional grants contained in sections 11503 and 11503a, none of the
four recognized bases for abstention should apply in cases concern20 4
ing alleged state tax discrimination against rail or motor carriers.
First, the Pullman abstention doctrine is inappropriate because
federal courts can decide federal statutory issues that plaintiffs
raise under sections 11503 and 11503a without addressing constitutional questions. 0 5 Additionally, although state courts have adjudicated the legality of state taxing policies regarding interstate carriers for decades, Congress has concluded that state courts generally
have failed to provide an adequate and efficient remedy. 20 6 Even if
the litigation covered only constitutional issues, 2 07 federal judicial
abstention would injure plaintiffs because state courts have not
provided a speedy remedy for preventing property tax discrimination. Second, the Burford abstention doctrine is inapplicable because a federal court applies federal rather than state law when
203. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976). The standard of this category is "wise judicial administration." Id. at 817 (quoting
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)); see also North
Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 315 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
204. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 527 (11th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559 F. Supp.
1237, 1249 (D. Ariz. 1983). But see North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs,
590 F. Supp. 311, 315 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Tax Div., 504 F. Supp. 907,
913 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
205. See Pue v. Sillas, 632 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Ninth Circuit has developed the following three requirements that a court must
consider in determining whether the Pullman abstention doctrine applies in a particular
case:
(1) The complaint "touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal
courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open."
(2) "Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive ruling on
the state issue would terminate the controversy."
(3) The possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful.
Id. (quoting Canton v. Spokane School Dist., 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974)).
Because none of these three criteria is satisfied, the Pullman abstention doctrine
plainly is inapplicable in § 11503 and § 11503a cases.
206. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
207. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]here are fundamental objections" to requiring a plaintiff that properly filed a lawsuit in a federal district court
claiming federal constitutional violations to accept a state court decision. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964). Thus, when an interstate
carrier alleges only federal constitutional violations and invokes the jurisdiction of a federal
district court, all parties, as well as the judicial system, have an interest in avoiding unnecessary delay by having the federal court decide the case. See Bally Mfg. Corp. v. Casino
Control Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 1213, 1216-18 (D.N.J. 1982) (applying the Pullman and England rules).
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evaluating claims under sections 11503 and 11503a. Applying federal law poses no threat to the development of a coherent state
taxation policy.20 8 Third, the Younger abstention doctrine is inappropriate because the national importance of unburdened interstate commerce outweighs any state interest in maintaining a discriminatory property tax structure. 209 Finally, judicial economy is
an insufficient reason for abstention because Congress, confronted
with inadequate state remedies, specifically enacted these statutes
2 10
to provide a federal forum for rail and motor carrier plaintiffs.
Abstention is improper even when state court proceedings challenging the validity of the state tax law has already commenced.
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
duplicative proceedings in federal courts typically are undesirable,
the general rule is that a suit may proceed in federal court despite
the pendency of a similar action in state court.'
While most federal courts have properly accepted jurisdiction
over suits alleging violations of sections 11503 and 11503a, all four
categories have served as the basis for abstention. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Tax Division21 2 is the most prominent example of
federal abstention. In Missouri Pacific the plaintiff railroads sued
208. See Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 527 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that Burford abstention is inapplicable in a § 11503 action), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984). The fact that the federal statutes direct the use of state burden of proof standards demonstrates congressional deference to coherent state taxation policies. See supra
notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
209. See Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Cochran, 546 F. Supp. 904, 910-11 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981).
210. See Atchison, T. &. S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Kan. 1982),
afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that federal courts have "virtually [an]
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Consequently, abstention for
judicial economy is valid only under circumstances even more exceptional than those circumstances required for invoking the three traditional abstention categories. See id. at 818;
see also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (legislative history).
211. 424 U.S. at 817. The Supreme Court has determined that a federal court may
consider several factors in deciding whether to abstain in favor of a state court with concurrent jurisdiction. These factors include, but are not limited to, the convenience of the federal forum, the preference for litigating all issues in one suit, and whether the federal or
state court obtained jurisdiction first. Id. at 818. The Court stated that "[olnly the clearest
of justifications will warrant dismissal." Id. at 819 (emphasis added). More recently, the
Court reiterated that the balance of these factors is "heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
16 (1983) (emphasis added).
212. 504 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Ark. 1980). Missouri Pacific was the first case in which a
federal court abstained in an action brought pursuant to §§ 11503 or 11503a. See id. at 912
& n.1.
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in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, complaining that the Arkansas ad valorem property tax assessments and collections violated section 11503, deprived them of
property without federal due process, and denied them of the four2 13
teenth amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law.
According to the district court, even though section 11503 provided
for the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts, federalism and comity mandated that an Arkansas state court first decide
the issues because of the great importance of property taxes to the
state.214 In addition, the court noted that state courts have equal
responsibilities to uphold federal constitutional principles and concluded that the Arkansas state court system would provide a fair,
speedy, and adequate forum.2 1 5 Consequently, the court declined
to exercise jurisdiction, invoking the Pullman, Burford, and
Younger doctrines of abstention.1 6 Similarly, in North American
Van Lines, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners217 the plaintiff alleged that Indiana's newly revised taxing policies regarding
the transportation property of interstate motor carriers violated
section 11503a and several federal and state constitutional provisions. 218 Although the court concluded that the traditional Pullman, Burford, and Younger categories did not apply, the court
found that the "wise judicial administration of judicial resources"
required that it refuse jurisdiction. 19
213. Id. at 909.
214. Id. at 910-11.
215. Id. at 911.
216. Id. at 910-13. The court wrote its opinion as if all three abstention doctrines applied. See North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 316-17
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (stating that it was "unclear as to which of the three traditional forms of
abstention the court relied upon").
217. 590 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
218. Id. The Indiana statute imposed an ad valorem tax on "indefinite-situs distributable property" of interstate motor carriers. Id. at 313.
The court considered the following factors to decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction:
"(1) the desire or ability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, (2) the order in which jurisdiction
was obtained by the concurrent forums, (3) the inconvenience of the federal forum, and (4)
the court first assuming jurisdiction over any property which may be involved in the suit."
Id. at 317 (quoting Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234
(7th Cir. 1979)).
219. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 315-19
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952)).
The court determined that it should stay the proceedings because an appeal was pending in
state court pertaining to the constitutionality of the state tax scheme. See id. at 319.
In Huie v. Private Truck Council, Inc., 466 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 1984), the case in favor of
which the North American Van Lines court stayed its proceedings, the Indiana Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's holding that Indiana's ad valorem tax system discriminated
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Federal court abstention in lawsuits alleging violations of sections 11503 and 11503a is inappropriate, 220 however, because Congress specifically created exceptions to the Tax Injunction Act in
these sections and authorized federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over cases concerning state tax discrimination against rail and motor carrier transportation property. 22 1 Congress conferred this jurisdiction on the federal courts because it determined that state
remedies were inadequate.2 2 2 In Southern Railway Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 3 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit noted that the legislative history of section
11503 indicates that Congress concluded "both a federal remedy
against interstate commerce by imposing unreasonably burdensome property taxes on interstate motor carriers. Consequently, the federal district court did not need to decide North
American Van Lines. See also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 795
F.2d 1442, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the Ninth Circuit found that federal courts have
jurisdiction to resolve valuation issues under section 11503, it held that "the district court
should abstain from deciding the merits of the valuation issue" in this case because the
railroads had chosen to file suit in state court initially and not to challenge "the administrative assessment action in federal court in the first instance." Id. The court apparently failed
to consider that the confused state of the law regarding federal court jurisdiction over valuation issues was the likely reason for plaintiffs filing suit in both forums.
220. See Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 527 (11th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). (holding that because "Congress meant unconditionally
to ensure a federal forum for section 11503 claims,. . . the statute bars abstention in cases
alleging de facto discrimination as well as de jure"); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 559
F. Supp. 1237, 1248-49 (D. Ariz. 1983) (denying state's request that the court abstain from
deciding plaintiffs de facto discrimination claim).
221. Sections 11503(c) and 11503a(c) each state in pertinent part that
"[nJotwithstandingsection 1341 of title 28 . . . a district court of the United States has
jurisdiction. . . to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section." (emphasis added).
See Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 528 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494, 498 (10th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984); Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 584 F. Supp. 1229,
1232 (S.D. Iowa 1984), modified, 766 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1985); see also S. REP. No. 630, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1969) (discussing the negative impact of the Tax Injunction Act on
interstate carriers).
The United States Supreme Court has held that, under the comity principle, federal
courts must abstain when taxpayers bring actions against states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
provided that state remedies are "plain, adequate, and complete." Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981). By contrast, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c)
and 11503a(c) specifically require federal courts to invoke their jurisdiction. See Southern
Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 527 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984) (stating that the legislative history of § 11503, "unlike that of section 1983,
evinces a congressional intent to exempt taxpayer plaintiffs from the Tax Injunction Act as
well as from the comity principle"). The court distinguished a § 11503 action from a § 1983
action. Id. at 529-30. This distinction is significant because rail or motor carrier plaintiffs
may bring suit under either or both statutes.
222. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
223. 715 F.2d 522 (11th Cir. 1983).
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and a federal forum were necessary to further the strong national
policy of protecting interstate commerce from the disruptive effects of discriminatory state and local taxation of railroad property. ' 224 The court decided that all categories of abstention are inapplicable because Congress enacted section 11503 to guarantee
that railroads have the opportunity to bring lawsuits alleging state
tax discrimination in federal courts.22 5 Federal court abstention
defeats Congress' purpose by bypassing this remedial legislation
and returning to deficient state remedies. 26 In addition, the delay
that abstention causes could irreparably harm a plaintiff's case and
financial situation by prohibiting the plaintiff from using the disputed funds because of the possibly improper state or local tax
assessment.2 27
F.

Statutory Relief

1.

Injunctive Relief

Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, pursuant to sections 11503(c) and 11503a(c), "to prevent" state and local
tax laws from unreasonably burdening and discriminating against
224. Id. at 529.
225. See id. at 529-30; see also Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, 599 F. Supp. 1237,
1249 (D. Ariz. 1983) (holding that federal court abstention in a case arising under the 4R
Act is improper); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Kan. 1982)
(holding that the legislative history "envisions" a federal forum for cases arising under the
4R Act because state court remedies are clearly insufficient), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on different issues, 732 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1984).
226. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
227. Cf. North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311,
318-19 & nn.1-2 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
In North American Van Lines, the court determined that the parties minimized the
harm that the abstention's delay caused by placing the disputed tax money in an interest
bearing escrow account. Id. at 318. Furthermore, the court observed that if plaintiff prevailed in federal district court, the state likely would appeal, resulting in additional delay.
Id. Thus, according to the court, staying the federal court proceedings in favor of the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in a separate case concerning a different plaintiff likely would
reduce the delay and benefit plaintiff. See id. at 318-19.
This reasoning is improper for several reasons. First, Congress enacted the statutes
under consideration to alleviate the interstate carriers' economic hardships. By restricting
the carriers' use of valuable funds that they may or may not have owed to the state, the
court may have caused these carriers to endure unnecessary financial burdens for an extended period. Second, the delays that appeals may cause are part of the judicial process
that any victorious plaintiff should expect and, therefore, should not serve as a basis for a
court declining to invoke its jurisdiction. Finally, if a federal district court stays a lawsuit to
await a decision in a different state court case and that decision proves unfavorable to plaintiff in the stayed proceedings, the federal court then must invoke its jurisdiction. This policy
clearly extends the delay.
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interstate commerce.2 2 8 Because the language of these statutes is
ambiguous, an examination of the original language of the 4R Act
provides guidance 229 on the appropriate preventive action. Section
306 of the 4R Act states that a court may grant "mandatory or
prohibitive injunctive relief, interim equitable relief, and declaratory judgments as may be necessary to prevent" any violations of
the statute's provisions. 230 Thus, injunctive relief is available to
prevent discriminatory taxation under both sections 11503 and
11503a. 2 "1 A court should enjoin the assessment or collection of any
discriminatory state or local tax.
A major flaw of section 1513(d) is that it provides no remedy
for plaintiffs once a court determines that a state or local government has unreasonably burdened or discriminated against interstate commerce through taxation of air carrier transportation
property. 232 The statute merely describes prohibited acts and defines key terms. The statute's brief legislative history, however, indicates that Congress intended the existing law regarding property
233
tax discrimination against motor carriers to apply to air carriers.
All remedies available to motor carrier plaintiffs, including an injunction, should, therefore, be available to air carrier plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs may seek a preliminary injunction in cases arising
under sections 11503, 11503a, or 1513(d). 3 4 Plaintiffs, however,
need not satisfy the "standard requirements" for a preliminary injunction because these statutes authorize injunctive relief.23 5 Al228. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 11503(c), 11503a(c) (West Supp. 1986) (partial revision of title 49).
229. See supra text following note 85 (noting appropriate occasions for comparison of
original and recodified language).
230. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210,
§ 396, 90 Stat. 31, 54.
231. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (10th Cir. 1981)
(remanding with orders to district court to enter a preliminary injunction); Clinchfield R.R.
v. Lynch, 605 F. Supp. 1005, 1020 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (ordering permanent injunction); Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 584 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (ordering injunction),
modified, 766 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1985); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Cochran, 546 F.
Supp. 904, 915 (M.D. Tenn.1981) (ordering permanent injunction against state from assessing discriminatory taxes on motor carrier transportation property).
232. See 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (1982).
233. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1188.
234. The obvious advantage of a preliminary injunction is that a court will prohibit
the application of an allegedly discriminatory state or local tax scheme to plaintiff until it
decides the merits of the case.
235. See Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 869 (9th Cir.)
(concluding that "traditional prerequisites for equitable relief need not be satisfied before a
preliminary injunction may be issued under § 11503"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Arizona, No. 81-1279, slip op. at (D. Ariz. May 2, 1983)
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though trial courts have discretion over whether to order an injunction, they must base their decisions on Congress' legislative
purpose and on the facts of each case.2" 6 Courts have deferred to
congressional intent by not requiring plaintiffs to prove that they
will experience irreparable harm or that their legal remedies are
inadequate before granting a preliminary injunction.28 7 Courts may
order a preliminary injunction without requiring plaintiffs to show
that they "positively" will prevail on the merits. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate merely a "reasonable probability of success." 238 Finally, in considering the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
courts must determine whether there is reason to believe that defendants have violated or will violate the statutes. 29 To obtain a

preliminary injunction, plaintiffs need not show that defendants
intentionally discriminated against them.24 °
After obtaining a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff may seek
permanent relief. Plaintiff's primary goal under sections 11503,
11503a, and 1513(d) is to convince a court to enjoin permanently
the assessment and collection of discriminatory taxes. To obtain a
permanent injunction, a plaintiff must satisfy its burden of proof
and prevail on the merits. 241 Another available form of permanent

relief is for a court to order the discriminating state to modify its
tax system so that the ratio of assessed value to true market value
(holding that "[e]ven if equitable decisions are allowed to play a role in this decision . . . it
cannot be argued seriously that the State and counties have not been put on notice that
their tax practices have been discriminatory and would violate the 4-R Act when it came
into effect") (available on LEXIS).
236. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 258-59 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by considering only the facts of the case
and not the purpose of § 11503).
237. See Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 210 (M.D. Tenn. 1979),
aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981); see also Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Tennessee v. Louisville &
N, supra, and noting that courts in various cases have applied the rule that this court established for use in a § 11503 action).
238. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 260-61 (10th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that "[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo" until
plaintiff can prove its case).
239. See id. at 261; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 531 F. Supp. 220, 234 (D. Kan.
1981).
240. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1985); Louisville
and N. R.R. v. Department of Revenue, 736 F.2d 1495, 1498 (ith Cir. 1984); Burlington N.
R.R. v. Department of Revenue, No. C85-767T, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 1985).
241. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text; see also Clinchfield R.R. v.
Lynch, 605 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (permanently enjoining defendants from assessing and collecting taxes in accordance with discriminatory state and local tax structure violating § 11503).
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of the rail, motor, or air carrier property involved in the litigation

is reduced to, or below, the ratio of assessed value to true market
value of other commercial and industrial property. 2 This remedy,
if applied in rail or motor carrier litigation in federal court, however, may conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Moses
Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County.2" In reversing the district
court, the Supreme Court held that a federal court has no power to
substitute a valid tax for an invalid tax because "[f]ederal courts
may not assess or levy taxes.

2 44

While a court may grant a perma-

nent injunction ordering the repayment of any funds collected
under a discriminatory assessment,24 5 a permanent injunction effectively requires a state to change its tax laws in accordance with
the federal court's decision. A federal court order directing a state
to equalize taxes and eliminate the state's discriminatory tax provisions may be an unconstitutional action to assess or levy taxes
under the Moses Lake standard.24 8
Under sections 11503 and 11503a, a court may grant injunctive
relief when the assessment ratio of rail or motor carrier property
"exceeds by at least five percent" the assessment ratio "of other
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. 2

47

When a plaintiff proves that this discriminatory varia-

tion exists, a court should enjoin completely the assessment and
collection of taxes above the rates established for other commercial
and industrial property and not merely above the five percent
threshold. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louisiana Tax
Commission24 8 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana confronted defendants' contention that an in242. See Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 472 F. Supp. 60, 64 (D. Ala. 1979) (ordering the State of Alabama to eliminate discriminatory taxation by equalizing assessment ratios of the railroad's property and the property of other commercial and industrial taxpayers). But see Louisville & N. R.R. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 498 F. Supp. 418, 423 (M.D.
La. 1980) (enjoining assessments under Louisiana tax scheme, but stating it "will not require ...

defendants to do anything").

243. 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
244. Id. at 752.
245. See infra notes 259-96 and accompanying text.
246. See Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.&., 478 F. Supp. 199, 210 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)
(distinguishing case at bar from Moses Lakes), afj'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 834 (1981). But see supra note 242 and accompanying text.
247. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(c) and 11503a(c) (1982).
For a discussion of relief under § 1513(d), see infra notes 250-52 and accompanying
text.
248. 498 F. Supp. 418, 423 (M.D. La. 1980). Defendants argued that because the assessment ratio for other commercial and industrial property was 15%, § 11503 permitted
them to tax rail transportation property at a rate of 20%. Id.

1148

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1107

junction should apply only to taxes levied against railroads that
surpass the five percent excess permitted by section 11503(c). The
court rejected defendants' argument, noting that Congress selected
the five percent standard to distinguish between material discrimination, which required a remedy, and immaterial variations in assessments, which if remedied would unnecessarily overburden
courts with innumerable minor lawsuits. Once a tax system exceeds
that five percent threshold, however, the court noted that it then
has statutory jurisdiction to prevent all discrimination, defined as
any difference in assessment ratios to the disadvantage of the carrier.2' 4 9 The court, therefore, completely enjoined defendants from
collecting discriminatory taxes from plaintiffs.
On the face of section 1513(d), air carrier plaintiffs have an
advantage over rail and motor carrier plaintiffs in obtaining relief. 5 Section 1513(d) does not establish any threshold requirements to invoke the court's remedial powers. 51 A court, therefore,
may prohibit any minor variation in assessment ratios resulting in
the collection of more taxes from air carriers than from other commercial and industrial property owners. However, because the legislative history of section 1513(d) indicates that Congress intended
the provisions of the motor carrier statute to apply to air carriers,
Congresg also may have intended to require a five percent variation
in assessment ratios before a court could grant relief under section
1513(d). 5 2 To date, no court has addressed this issue.
2.

Relief From Tax Rate Discrimination

A state or locality can discriminate through differing tax rates
as well as through assessments or valuations. Although tax discrimination may occur when the assessment ratio of a rail or motor
carrier's transportation property does not exceed the assessment
ratio of other commercial and industrial property by at least five
percent in the same assessment jurisdiction, sections 11503 and
11503a indicate that a five percent difference in the ratio must exist before a court may grant relief. The Ninth Circuit has addressed this percentage question in a suit involving tax rate dis249.
250.
ing access
251.
252.

See id.; 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503 and 11503a (1982).
This apparent advantage may be offset by the possible disadvantage of not havto a federal forum. See 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (1982); supra note 187.
See id.
See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1188.
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crimination against a rail carrier. 5 3 In affirming the district court's
grant of injunctive relief to plaintiffs, the court determined that it
must construe section 11503 according to Congress' intent in enacting the statute rather than narrowly and literally so as to defeat
its purpose. 254 Congress enacted sections 11503 and 11503a to prevent all discriminatory state and local property taxation because of
its unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. 55 A court, therefore, should be able to grant relief from discrimination in tax rates
as well as from discrimination in assessments. 5' The Ninth Circuit
held that because a literal reading of the statute would lead to an
"absurd result," a court may "look beyond [its] express
language.

'257

3.

Restitution and the Eleventh Amendment

8

The eleventh amendment 5 9 creates a formidable jurisdictional
limitation on the power of federal courts to order states to refund
taxes collected under invalid state tax laws.26 ° Under a Supreme
Court rule, "a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability
which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment."2 61 Congress, however, can
abrogate state immunity, through appropriate legislation, in two
ways. First, the enforcement provisions of section 5 of the four253. See Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Department of Revenue, 604 F.
Supp. 1575 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (enjoining state from applying discriminatory tax rate).
Because the 5% variation is not an express requirement for relief under § 1513(d), air
carriers clearly can obtain relief from tax rate discrimination despite the absence of an assessment ratio variation.
254. Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
255. See supra notes 6-33 and accompanying text.
256. Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860, 865-66 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
257. Id. at 866.
258. The eleventh amendment issue does not apply to air carriers because federal
courts apparently do not have jurisdiction under § 1513(d). See supra note 187.
259. The eleventh amendment provides the following: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
260. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Bair, 584 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 Iowa 1984), modified, 766
F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1985).
261. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The Supreme Court, however, also
has concluded that plaintiffs may obtain prospective injunctive relief against state officials
who have violated the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 663-64; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).

1150

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1107

teenth amendment 2 2 empower Congress to limit state sovereignty
through

"appropriate

legislation.

'2 3

Second,

the supremacy

clause 264

enables Congress to abrogate state sovereignty through
legislation that is "unmistakably and clearly" designed to accomplish that purpose.265 Additionally, states may waive their immunity. 6e Without a waiver by the states or congressional legislation
authorizing tax reimbursements by the states, a federal court must
dismiss a complaint seeking reimbursement because plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 67
The federal courts' broad equitable powers, however, directly
conflict with the eleventh amendment. The Supreme Court has
recognized that federal courts can exercise any or all of their available equitable powers over suits in equity. In Porter v. Warner
Holding Co. 268 the Court held that "[u]nless otherwise provided by

statute, all inherent equitable powers of the District Court are
available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdic-

tion. 26 9 Later, in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.2 70 the

Court quoted extensively from Porter and held that "[w]hen Con262. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment states that "[t]he Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
263. Id.; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that "Congress may,
in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purposes of enforcing the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts") (footnote omitted)).
264. See supra note 56.
265. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147 (1985); see als6
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1973). The Supreme Court apparently has retreated from its decision in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 192 (1964), which held that the states relinquished their sovereignty to impose restrictions on interstate commerce when they ratified the commerce clause. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-72 (1974).
267. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 531 F. Supp. 220, 236 (D. Kan. 1981)
(dismissing plaintiff's claim for tax refund because the 4R Act only provides for prospective
relief); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974) (denying retrospective relief
to state taxpayer); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)
(denying refund to state taxpayer who paid taxes under protest, pursuant to an unconstitutional law, because the eleventh amendment barred the action).
268. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
269. Id. at 398. Porter concerned the enforcement provisions of § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which empowered federal courts to prevent violations of
the statute by issuing "a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order." Id. at 399 (emphasis added). The Court interpreted the "or other order" clause to
authorize any appropriate equitable relief other than an injunction, including restitution,
that is necessary and proper to fulfill the statutory purpose. See id. at 399-401.
270. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
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gress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions
contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete
relief in light of the statutory purposes. 27 1 The Court reaffirmed
these decisions in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co.,272 concluding that limitations on the federal courts' inherent
equitable powers should not be inferred from a statute's remedial
provisions because "Congress knows how to deprive a court of
2' 73
broad equitable power when it chooses so to do."
Although Congress was aware of the federal courts' expansive
equitable powers, Congress did not expressly limit those powers
when enacting sections 11503 and 11503a. Instead, Congress explicitly stated that federal courts may exercise their equity jurisdiction "to devise remedies that will not be burdensome to the
communities involved." 27 4 Thus, federal courts should have the authority to order restitution as an equitable remedy appropriate and
necessary to fulfill the purpose of these statutes.
Federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions over
whether Congress, acting pursuant to its commerce clause powers,
abolished the states' eleventh amendment immunity to lawsuits for
the recovery of retrospective monetary relief when it passed the 4R
Act. 275 In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lennen
271. Id. at 291-92. The Court held that restitution was an appropriate equitable remedy to prevent violations of § 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Id. at 28996.
272. 415 U.S. 1 (1973).
273. Id. at 19-20. The Court explained that its Porterdecision was based primarily on
the traditionally broad inherent powers of an equity court rather than the statute's "or
other order" provision. See id. at 19. For a discussion of the possible limited applicability of
Porterand Mitchell to cases involving state rather than private defendants, see also infra
note 280.
274. H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1975).
275. The claim for tax refunds has arisen in several § 11503 suits, but not directly in a
§ 11503a or § 15131(d) action. Nevertheless, tax refunds have been an issue in at least two
cases, indirectly related to § 11503a, concerning interstate motor carriers. See American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. O'Neill, 522 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Conn. 1981) (considering refund
issue under Connecticut law in a case deciding legality of state's annual registration fee for
interstate motor carriers); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, 514 F. Supp. 1341,
1344 (D. Vt. 1981) (considering refund issue under the Tax Injunction Act in a case concerning Vermont statutes requiring interstate motor carriers to purchase more expensive
permits).
Additionally, tax refunds have been recognized as an issue related to enforcement of §
1513(d). See Letter from Norman Y. Mineta, Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Bob Packwood,
and Howard W. Cannon to Paul R. Ignatius, President of the Air Transport Ass'n of
America (Dec. 21, 1982) (suggesting states should refund property taxes assessed and collected in violation of § 1513(d) after Sept. 3, 1982, the statute's effective date), reprintedin
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the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for the refund of taxes
paid without protest.2 76 The district court refused to decide the
claim without "an express or implied grant of jurisdiction by Congress. . to provide such relief" and it found no grant "in either
the language or purpose of the 4-R Act. '277 On appeal 278 the Tenth

Circuit observed that the district court's reasoning was "sensible,"
but analogized plaintiffs' refund claim to cases presenting similar
issues decided by the Supreme Court and concluded that the 4R
Act did not necessarily prohibit restitution.27 9 Although the court
affirmed the dismissal below, it suggested that had the plaintiffs
paid their 1979 Kansas property taxes under protest, they would
have preserved an equitable basis for relief and restitution would
have been appropriate.2 80 By contrast, in Burlington Northern
Railroad Co. v. Bair,"1 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa determined that the 4R Act did not
"clearly" empower federal courts to order states to reimburse taxpayers for funds collected through an illegal tax and, therefore,
concluded that the eleventh amendment barred such an action.
Courts should find that the 4R Act's language and purpose
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d 106, 113 (S.D. 1985), prob. juris.
noted, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986). Any prohibition against federal courts ordering refunds would
not apply in an action under § 1513(d) because those cases apparently fall only under state
court jurisdiction. See supra note 186. The eleventh amendment does not limit the state
courts' authority to order tax refunds.
276. 531 F. Supp. 220, 236 (D. Kan. 1981).
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1506 (10th Cir. 1984). Although this decision was the direct result of an appeal from the district court's 1982 ruling,
reported at 552 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Kan. 1982), it was the culmination of litigation initiated
in federal court in 1981, discussed supra at 276-77 and accompanying text.
279. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1984). The
court quoted extensively from Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), discussed supra at notes 26873 and accompanying text.
280. See 732 F.2d at 1507. The court contended that plaintiffs' failure to protest
caused the state taxing agencies to budget and spend the money collected from these taxes.
Restitution at that point, therefore, would have been inequitable. Id. One should note, however, that the Tenth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court decisions involving private rather
than state defendants. The Supreme Court itself has observed that "[s]ince neither [Porter
nor Mitchell] involved a suit against a State or a state official, it did not purport to decide
the availability of equitable relief consistent with the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 n.15 (1974). See also Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 511 F. Supp. 553, 558 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (suggesting that although money damages
against the State of California were appropriate, an injunction would more adequately safeguard plaintiff's rights), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 697 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984).
281. 584 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (S.D. Iowa 1984), modified, 766 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1985).
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"unmistakably and clearly"2 82 confer jurisdiction on federal courts
to order refunds for taxes that states assess and collect in violation
of the Act's provisions.28 s In determining the 4R Act's intent, a
court first must examine the statute's "plain" language.2 84 Section
306 of the 4R Act originally conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts "to grant such mandatory or prohibitive injunctive relief, interim equitable relief, and declaratory judgements as may be
necessary to prevent, restrain, or terminate any acts in violation of
this section. ' 285 As finally codified, section 11503 states that federal courts have jurisdiction "to prevent a violation" of the statute. 2 6 Although Congress intended no substantive change when
recodifying the 4R Act,287 the specific authorization to federal
courts to prevent state and local tax discrimination against rail
transportation property plainly became the effective law. 88 Furthermore, Congress gave no indication that it intended the types of
relief specified in the original language to be exclusive remedies. In
addition, Congress delayed the statute's effectiveness for three
years, giving the states an opportunity to eliminate their discriminatory practices.2 8 9 Consequently, Congress gave federal courts a
282. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text. By enacting the 4R Act under its
broad commerce clause powers, Congress made its language and purpose binding on the
states through the supremacy clause. See id.; Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d
398, 407 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating Congress has broad commerce clause powers).
283. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1984)
(implying that refunds are appropriate under certain circumstances). Under similar reasoning federal courts also may order refunds in cases arising under § 11503a.
See also Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 591 F. Supp. 209, 224-25
(E.D. Va. 1984) (stating that facts of certain cases might require a refund), modified, 762
F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1985); supra note 265 and accompanying text (arguing that the limitation
on Parden v.Terminal Ry. enunciated by the Supreme Court in Employees v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare should not apply in suits arising under §§ 11503 and 11503a
because these statutes' purpose and language indicate that Congress intended to abrogate
state sovereignty).
284. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 531 F. Supp. 220, 236 (D. Kan. 1981) (quoting
Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981)).
285. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, §
306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (emphasis deleted).
286. 49 U.S.C. § 11503(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
287. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir. 1981); supra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
288. See Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 410 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that "only the recodification of section 306 ever went into effect" and that "[i]t
is not
necessary to interpret language in a statute that never went into effect"); supra notes 83-84
and accompanying text.
289. States' failure to eliminate discriminatory taxation after this three year period
also may constitute a waiver of immunity and subject states to refunds ordered by federal
courts. See supra note 269 and accompanying text; cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673
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mandate to redress violations of section 11503 through remedies
that will most effectively prevent the unreasonable burdening of
interstate commerce through discriminatory property taxation. Effective remedies available to federal courts include, but are not
limited to, the refund of taxes collected under the invalid state tax
law and injunctive and declaratory relief.
Although taxpayers may seek refunds under sections 11503,
11503a, and 1513(d), courts nevertheless should consider several
additional factors in determining whether refund relief fulfills the
statutory purpose of each Act.2 90 First, courts should consider the

particular state's history of property tax discrimination against
rail, motor, and air carriers. 9 ' Second, courts should examine the
state's efforts to eliminate discrimination after the passage of these
statutes.2 Third, courts should study plaintiff's efforts to determine whether taxes were discriminatory before payment. 293 Fourth,
courts should ascertain whether the taxpayer paid the discriminatory taxes under protest.2

4

Fifth, courts should determine how

soon after the state assessed and collected the taxes that plaintiffs
filed suit.2 9 5 Last, and most importantly, courts should determine
(1974) (holding that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the
surrender of constitutional rights" and that the Court "will find waiver only where stated
'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' ") (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
290. Cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1507 (10th Cir. 1984). The
court held that restitution in this particular case would not serve the purposes of § 11503
after considering several factors, including plaintiffs' failure to pay under protest and the
probability that local taxing authorities had budgeted and spent the taxes improperly assessed and collected. Id.
291. Refunds may be the only significant way for courts to impress upon state taxing
authorities with long histories of legislating discrimination that the courts will enforce vigorously the congressional purpose embodied in these statutes. Cf. Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v.
Department of Taxation, 591 F. Supp. 209, 224-25 (E.D. Va. 1984), modified, 762 F.2d 375
(4th Cir. 1985).
292. Section 11503, in particular, was enacted three years before becoming effective.
The states, therefore, had an extensive period to reform their taxing policies regarding rail
transportation property. Once the rail carrier changes were made, states should have been
able to eliminate discrimination more easily against motor and air carriers following the
passage of §§ 11503a and 1513(d).
293. Plaintiffs failing to undertake a good faith effort to determine whether a state tax
is discriminatory and, therefore, in violation of §§ 11503, 11503a, or 1513(d) do not deserve
equitable monetary relief.
294. Courts should not award refunds to plaintiffs that fail to protest the assessment
and collection of a discriminatory tax. A protest puts the state and local taxing authorities
on notice that they should not immediately budget and spend those taxes. Cf. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1507 (10th Cir. 1984).
295. Prompt filing of a lawsuit against state or local taxing authorities following the
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the potential impact of the refund order on state and local
services. 2 6
Despite the constitutional, statutory, and judicial complexities
related to awarding restitution, tax refunds should become less important in future litigation concerning sections 11503, 11503a, and
1513(d). Since Congress enacted these statutes, rail, motor, and air
carrier plaintiffs have had the opportunity to develop strategies to
preserve their claims to refunds under potentially discriminatory
property tax laws. The interstate carriers have recognized that by
failing to adequately safeguard their interests, they are vulnerable
to ad hoc judicial decision-making on the issue of tax refunds.
4. Denial of Permanent Relief
Upon the denial of permanent relief, a court should not allow
a state or local government to penalize a plaintiff for failure, pursuant to a preliminary injunction, to pay disputed taxes. A penalty
under these circumstances would thwart the congressional purpose
in enacting sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d).2 97 Tax discrimination may continue uncorrected if potential plaintiffs determine
that paying a discriminatory tax is more economical than bearing
delinquency penalties and the high costs of litigation. Although
courts should not hold plaintiffs responsible for penalties on disputed taxes, plaintiffs should pay interest for the nonpayment of
funds representing undisputed taxes. Otherwise, plaintiffs would
enjoy unjust enrichment because they had the opportunity to use
funds properly owed to the state.2 98
assessment and collection of an allegedly discriminatory property tax serves as constructive
notice of a protest.
296. If a refund would result in unreasonable hardship on citizens by limiting the
availability of essential services such as police and fire protection, then such relief seems
highly burdensome and, therefore, contrary to congressional intent. See supra note 274 and
accompanying text.
297. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1506 (10th Cir. 1984)
(denying payment of a penalty and stating that "[a]ny state law that frustrates or conflicts
with the lawful objective of a federal statute must yield to the federal authority") (quoting
United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 656 F.2d 131, 135 n.4 (5th Cir.
1981)); Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1983) (prohibiting a
penalty for the withholding of taxes pursuant to a preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1067 (1984).
298. See Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522, 530-31 (11th Cir.
1983) (ordering district court to modify its preliminary injunction and to require payment of
interest on undisputed taxes), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
Problems may arise in calculating the proper interest penalty when a plaintiff withholds
funds in accordance with a preliminary injunction. See id. at 531. Under these circumstances, a state would be acting inequitably by demanding a penalty at a rate greater than
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VI. INTERSTATE OIL PIPELINES

The negative tax consequences that led Congress to pass legislation protecting rail, motor, and air carriers continue to burden
interstate oil pipelines. Although Congress originally considered oil
pipelines among the industries requiring federal protection from
discriminatory state and local property taxation, Congress has
failed to enact any corrective legislation."' Consequently, states
continue to classify oil pipeline property in the same category as
public utilities, at the highest assessment and tax rates.3 00 This
taxing policy is constitutional under the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause, 30 1 provided the state has a rational basis
for its classification and equally taxes all types of property within
the classification.3 0 2 Under these standards, a court likely will not
hold that a state legislature has exceeded its powers by arbitrarily
enacting a tax system that discriminates against oil pipelines even
though Congress prohibits identical state tax discrimination
against other interstate carriers. Although no reasonable justification exists for denying federal statutory protection to oil pipelines
when other interstate carriers enjoy such protection, Congress,
through its inaction, has perpetuated tax discrimination against oil
pipelines. This situation, nevertheless, offers Congress an excellent
opportunity to develop legislation that effectively remedies property tax discrimination against oil pipelines. This situation also
provides an impetus to amend the present rail, motor, and air carrier statutes to clarify ambiguities and promote uniformity among
the courts.
that which the plaintiff reasonably could have earned through investment.
299. See S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Seass. 3 (1972); S.REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 2d
Seass. 3 (1969); S.RFP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Seass. 1-2 (1968); S.RFP. No. 445, 87th Cong.,
1st Seass. 445 (1961).
300. See State v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 408 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (upholding the State of Alabama's tax classification of oil pipelines in "Class I" along with public
utilities). But see Ex Porte Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 1985) (Embry, J.,
dissenting) (contending, in an extensive analysis, that Alabama's tax classification scheme is
arbitrary and capricious and that the state should not tax oil pipelines differently than
other common carriers).
301. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause provides that a state shall
not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1.
302. See State v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 408, 412-13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)
(discussing rational basis test); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 366-70
(1940) (holding a tax classification system is constitutional under the equal protection
clause).
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CONCLUSION

After approximately twenty years of deliberation, Congress enacted legislation to protect rail, motor, and air carriers from discriminatory state and local property taxation. Despite the extended debate, Congress left many ambiguities in the statutes that
require courts to legislate in their judicial interpretations. Diverse
judicial interpretations of sections 11503, 11503a, and 1513(d) have
left the status of these laws in confusion. Courts disagree over both
the extent of their jurisdiction under the statutes and the application of these statutory provisions in resolving litigation. Congress'
failure to specify the factors courts should consider in developing
an "average" commercial and industrial taxpayer to compare with
plaintiffs in determining whether tax discrimination exists is responsible for much of this judicial disagreement.
As a consequence of judicial differences, a plaintiff may receive complete relief in one jurisdiction, but, under the same facts,
little or no relief in another. No justification exists for this possible
inconsistency. Certain plaintiffs should not benefit because they
were fortunate to have their property located within a favorable
jurisdiction. Either Congress must amend these statutes to correct
their ambiguous provisions and promote a more uniform judicial
interpretation or the United States Supreme Court must finally
grant certiorari,3 03 denied several times, 30 and establish a precedent for lower courts to follow in resolving issues arising under
these statutes. The availability of valuation relief and the proper
method for proving discriminatory assessments under the statutes
are the two most ripe areas of conflict among federal appellate
303. Sup. CT. R. 17.1 states that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari only for "special and important" reasons. These reasons, in pertinent part, include conflicts among federal courts of appeals and decisions by state or federal courts on important federal law
issues that the Court has not decided. See Sup. CT. R. 17.1(a) and (c). See also infra note
305 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bair, 338 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984); Southern Ry. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 715 F.2d 522 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984); Ogilvie v. State Bd. of Equalization, 657
F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981); Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 834 (1981).
The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986), on appeal from the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1985). Because that case raises only a limited number
of issues, any decision by the Court can only begin to resolve the confused state of the law
regarding § 1513(d).
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courts that the Supreme Court should resolve."0 5
Although the statutes' shortcomings have resulted in much litigation, Congress' purpose, nevertheless, has been achieved. Courts
have invalidated many state and local tax schemes because of their
discriminatory effects. While the courts' conflicting standards for
finding statutory violations have contributed to the continuation of
discriminatory taxation, a more uniform interpretation and application of these laws will fulfill Congress' goal and efficiently and
effectively deal with property tax discrimination against rail, motor, and air carriers.
Scott M. Schoenwald

305. For the conflict over valuation relief, see Burlington N. R.R. v.Bair, 766 F.2d
1222, 1225-27 (8th Cir. 1985), and Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494, 498 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984), discussed supra at notes 173-86 and accompanying text. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in the Supreme Court of
the United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Burlington N. R.R. v. Lennen, 715
F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1067 (1984). The United States implied
that when legal issues are no longer novel and the circuits conflict in their statutory construction, the Supreme Court must provide a resolution. Id. at 16.
For the conflict over the proper methods for proving discriminatory assessments, compare Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 732 F.2d 1495, 1504 (10th Cir. 1984), and ACF
Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1983), with Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 700
F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983), discussed supra at notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
In addition, the conflict among federal circuits over whether to follow the 4R Act's original or recodified language requires resolution by the Supreme Court. For an example of this
conflict, see Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Taxation, 762 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir.
1985), and Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 656 F.2d 398, 404, 410 (9th Cir. 1981),
discussed supra at notes 81-84 and accompanying text.

